It is well known that Kant distinguishes between two kinds of self-consciousness: transcendental apperception and empirical apperception (or, approximately, inner sense). However, Kant sometimes claims that “I think,” the general expression of transcendental apperception, expresses an indeterminate empirical inner intuition (IEI), which differs in crucial ways from the empirical inner intuition produced by inner sense. Such claims undermine Kant’s conceptual framework and constitute a recalcitrant obstacle to understanding his theory of self-consciousness. This paper analyzes the relevant passages, evaluates the major interpretations of IEI, revisits the notion of pure apperception, and proposes an alternative reading: IEI is a ubiquitous, nonfocal, “obscure,” and empirical inner intuition that is built into all nonintrospective conscious states. This reading can successfully account for the peculiarities of IEI, resolving a major mystery in Kant’s theory of self-consciousness.
Kant famously distinguishes between two kinds of self-consciousness: empirical and pure apperception. Both play a fundamental role in the
To explain why IEI poses an interpretative problem, an overview of Kant’s doctrine of apperception is necessary. Due to its complexity and obscurity, parts of this doctrine are controversial, so this preliminary presentation of its contentious aspects relies on Kant’s original texts and their
Pure apperception is the nonsensible self-consciousness that is essentially related to the
Consequently, pure apperception does not count as an experience (i.e., an empirical judgment about spatial or temporal objects); instead, it “precedes” any experience (A354, B276–277).
The term “inner sense” denotes either a type of self-consciousness or the faculty for this self-consciousness. As used in the first sense, “inner sense” means one’s empirical intuition of one’s inner states (A33/B49, A107, A176/B217; V-Met-K2/Heinze 28: 738).
When grounded on inner sense, the
(Q1) [1] [T]he proposition “I think,” insofar as it says so much as that I exist thinking, is not merely a logical function, but rather determines the subject (which is then at the same time an object) in regard to existence, [2] and this cannot take place without inner sense, whose intuition always makes available the object not as thing in itself but merely
Accordingly, the
Some peculiar remarks cannot be accommodated by what has been said thus far:
(Q2) [1] We must not be troubled by the fact that in this proposition [“I think”], which expresses the perception of oneself, I do have an inner experience, [2] and that therefore the rational psychology built on it is never pure but is based in part on an empirical principle. [3] For this inner perception is nothing more than the mere apperception [
In this passage, Kant speaks of “the mere apperception” that “makes even all transcendental concepts possible.” This is precisely what pure apperception does (A341/B399). Further evidence shows that the term “mere apperception” denotes pure perception (A546/B574, A400). It is thus perplexing that Kant regards pure apperception as inner perception, since pure apperception should be free from any sensible element. In the same way, it is puzzling that the formal proposition of pure apperception, the “I think,” expresses this “perception of oneself.” This is not the only puzzling passage concerning pure apperception in Kant’s
A deflationary explanation of the target passages would be that the
I agree that the equation of these two concepts is probably a slip; otherwise, we would have to accept that a representation could simultaneously be a thought and a perception.
Sceptics of a third type of
A contentious footnote in
(Q3) [1] The “I think” is, as has already been said, an empirical proposition, and contains within itself the proposition “I exist.” … [2] It expresses an indeterminate empirical intuition, i.e., perception
Apparently, Q3 and Q1 address the same type of
First, although both relate to an inner perception, the inner perception in Q1 represents an appearance (Q1.2), whereas that in Q3 represents neither an appearance nor a noumenon (Q3.4). This undermines Kant’s basic distinction between phenomenon and noumenon.
Second, the
Third, the
All these peculiarities involve a special indeterminacy of the IEI.
The
Consequently, Q3 and Q2 plausibly involve a special kind of inner intuition (i.e., IEI) that is distinct from the one (i.e., DEI) in Q1.
In addition to the deflationary approach mentioned above, there are four major strategies to accommodate IEI.
Famously, Rolf-Peter Horstmann construes the IEI as the forerunner and origin of the Fichtean “
The phrase “[the IEI’s being] given … only to thinking in general” indeed means that IEI provides empirical materials for the thought
IEI has also been seen as a perception of the
Some commentators maintain that in referencing “indeterminate empirical intuition,” Kant has in mind not an object-related representation but a bare sensation (henceforth, “initial sensation,” following
Advocates of both views rely on a distinct property of sensation:
[Q4] Sensation in itself is not an objective representation, and in it neither the intuition of space nor that of time is to be encountered, it has, to be sure, no extensive magnitude, but yet it still has…an intensive magnitude. (B208, similarly see Prol 4: 306)
Since sensation in itself does not involve the intuitions of space and time, “the real” of a sensation
The “subjective sensation” reading suffers from additional problems. Kant did not develop the notion “feeling of an existence” after the
Many commentators regard Q3.6 as crucial for deciphering the mysteries of IEI: the “I think” is an empirical proposition because it expresses an act of thinking, for which some empirical representations are required to supply materials.
Although this reading is dominant in the literature, it is untenable in crucial respects. First, a single instance of
The sensory materials required for the “that” clause could be outer or inner perceptions. Therefore, if the third approach were correct, then IEI could be an outer perception. However, the sensation of IEI grounds the “I exist” (Q3.2). What IEI represents is “mark[ed]” [
In this section, I argue that IEI is a nonfocal, obscure, and empirical inner intuition, and is accompanied by the obscure
This section revisits the nature of the
I will first demonstrate that the
[Q5] [1] The mere representation I in relation to all others (the collective unity of which it makes possible) is the transcendental consciousness. [2] Now it does not matter here whether this representation be
The italicized text indicates that the
The
As an actual mental state, the
The conclusions we have drawn so far in this section can also cast light on IEI. There is a kind of
One may object that these quotations, as interpreted above, contradict both the apperception principle (see §2.1) and Q5.2, since this principle does not require every cognitively meaningful representation to be actually accompanied by an instance of
In this section I argue that pure apperception is content awareness rather than act awareness. Pure apperception, as such, results from a theoretical abstraction that captures the contribution of mere intellect in self-consciousness. It is a mental item shared by all conscious states rather than a self-standing mental state. These considerations, combined with §4.1, clarify the relation between
In some texts, Kant asserts that pure apperception with the formal content “I think” is an immediate intellectual (or pure) consciousness of acts of thinking or synthesis (B133–134, B278, B153; Anth 7: 141–142; V-Met-K2/Heinze 28: 712–713).
A natural way of construing the notion of intellectual consciousness of acts of thinking is to read it as intellectual consciousness of mental acts
The third reading also requires that the subject be able to identify a mental act as a determinate object (i.e., as a particular mental act that has content
Pure apperception, despite being claimed as the intellectual consciousness of mental acts, is content awareness rather than act awareness.
Second, the “content awareness” reading offers a better explanation of pure apperception’s role and nature than the “act awareness” reading. Through content awareness, the subject has access to, and hence can manipulate, the content of individual mental acts occurring at different times. Content awareness is consequently presupposed by the unity of consciousness, which is in turn required for intellectual operations such as synthesis, judgment, and inference. In this sense, content awareness fulfills Kant’s description of the transcendental role of pure apperception (A341/B399–400). If pure apperception were intellectual act awareness, then it would be difficult to explain why basic operations of understanding require the highly demanding act awareness rather than content awareness. Additionally, content awareness is necessary for the subject to be aware of representations and to self-ascribe them by means of the
Third, the “content awareness” reading better accommodates textual evidence. In terms of content awareness rather than act awareness, pure apperception is described as “a consciousness of
[The thought that these representations given in intuition all together belong to me] still presupposes the possibility of [the consciousness of the synthesis of the representations], i.e., only because I can
Remarkably, the second, explanatory part of this passage does not appeal to act awareness. It suggests that “the consciousness of the synthesis” is consciousness of the synthesized content rather than consciousness of the synthetical act. A similar case, occurring just a few lines before at B133, further confirms this reading. Moreover, thinking is nothing but operating concepts and judgments (A68–69/B93–94, A126), and these are the contents of thought. Therefore, content awareness, although not an awareness of an act of thinking as such, is an awareness of the essence of such an act, and can count as consciousness of acts in a broad sense. Finally, Kant occasionally employs terms related to mental items, such as “representation” and “concept,” liberally: They can refer either to a mental state or act of some kind, or to its content.
It can be further argued that pure apperception is not a self-standing, distinct representation. The concept of “pure apperception” results from a theoretical abstraction: for a given conscious state, one focuses on that nonsensible, formal aspect which constitutes its transcendental conditions and abstracts from all its sensible components.
Strong textual evidence supports this reading. Pure apperception constitutes “the formal element” and empirical apperception “the material of consciousness” (Anth 7: 141–142).
[Q6] For inner experience in general and its possibility, or perception in general and its relation to another perception,
Note that Q6 immediately follows Q2, which contains the mysterious claim that pure apperception expresses a “perception of oneself.” Q6 evidently addresses this perception.
In light of my argumentation thus far, the notion of apperception underlying Q2 and Q6 can be outlined as follows: The actual, and, in conscious states, ubiquitous act of self-ascription
In this section I address the characteristics of IEI and its locus in the structure of self-consciousness, and will demonstrate that IEI is ubiquitous in nonintrospective conscious states. As such, it is obscure, since attention is externally focused. As introspection occurs rarely compared to outer experiences, conscious states (especially in the context of
Upon first inspection, IEI is always present in conscious states. There are two reasons for this. First, as argued in §4.1, the
This claim requires further specification and qualification concerning different modes of conscious states. In nonintrospective conscious states, attention is externally directed, i.e., toward objects in the material world. IEI is obscure insofar as attention is externally directed. This is because attention makes the representations inside its focus clear but leaves those that are outside its focus and inside the sensory field obscure.
On closer scrutiny, Q2 and Q3 address precisely the nonintrospective scenario. Their immediate contexts (i.e., A343/B401 and B421–423) show that the
A comparison with Q1 can further reinforce this observation. In Q1, Kant deals with “[t]he proposition ‘I think’, insofar as it says
I now demonstrate how the suggested reading explains all obscurities around the target passage Q3, and resolves long-standing controversies regarding IEI.
The suggested account offers a better explanation for the indeterminacy of IEI’s, which is the source of all the difficulties in Q3 (see especially Q3.2 and Q3.4). To see why, let us first query what this indeterminacy means. Perception is indeterminate in that its object is indeterminate (A374). To determine an object is to predicate something of it, i.e., to subsume the object under a concept (A571–572/B599–600; Log 9: 61, 94). Thus, IEI is indeterminate in that its sensory content cannot be subsumed under empirical concepts or categories.
The
I have demonstrated how the suggested reading explains the IEI’s indeterminacy. I will show why it is a better explanation by examining three major alternatives. First, one could invoke the Paralogisms (B406–409): there is no categorially determinable empirical intuition of the self.
Second, one could suggest that IEI, in contrast with DEI, consists of ephemeral, hardly conceptualizable sensations. Nevertheless, there is no reason to deny ephemerality to DEI but credit IEI with it, given that both result from sensibility’s being affected by the same spontaneous acts. In addition, the ephemerality is too strong to account for indeterminacy because an ephemeral feeling is indeterminable, whereas IEI is, although “not yet” determined, principally determinable at a later stage.
Finally, a more plausible suggestion would be that IEI and the
The three alternative readings concern material aspects of sensibility, i.e., sensory content (deficiency of intuition of self, or deficiency of outer experience) and sensory quality (ephemerality). If they are ruled out as loci for indeterminacy, then the only candidate left is the formal aspect of sensibility, i.e., temporality.
The suggested interpretation of the IEI also demystifies the cryptic Q3.3.
In sum, the
Indeed, what distinguishes IEI and DEI is whether their content can be organized under the unity of a transcendental idea. Although inner appearances, i.e., inner states that DEI represents, cannot be subsumed under a “concept of experience” (A682/B710), they can be thought “as if” (A684/B712; Prol 4: 334) they were predicates of an actual object—i.e., the I or, equivalently, the soul, which is a transcendental idea in the sense of “a thinking being” (A682–683/B710–711). The objectification underlying this predication rests upon the regulative use of the categories (A682–683/B710–711; Prol 4: 334).
This explains why IEI falls short of the application condition of the category of existence that is described in Q3.3(c). It also explains why the object of IEI can only be determined “through the category [of existence] in regard to time” at a later stage.
The suggested interpretation can also explain Q3.4. As mentioned, the most baffling aspect of Q3.4 is the remark that IEI, as a perception, does not have an appearance as its intentional object, but rather represents a thing that is unspecifiable but “in fact exist[s].” This claim abstrusely contradicts Kant’s definition of perception (B160). In my view, it is also motivated by the circumstance that IEI is obscure. As demonstrated, an obscure representation is unaccompanied by the empirical consciousness which inner sense generates. Such empirical consciousness provides the “feel” of the phenomenal qualities that constitute the sensory matter of a perception.
IEI is an empirical inner intuition of a mental act in an ordinary (i.e., nonintrospective) conscious state. IEI grounds the
Quotations from Kant’s works are from the
Henceforth, italics symbolize mental states. For example, “the
Henceforth I use “empirical intuition” interchangeably with “perception.” See Prol 4: 283, 350; Anth 7: 134n. For subtle distinctions between them, which do not influence the argumentation of this paper, see McLear (
Similarly, see Sturma (
Pure apperception is also called “transcendental apperception” (A106–107) or “transcendental consciousness” (A117n.). The term “apperception” denotes not only self-consciousness but also, occasionally, the faculty for self-consciousness (A115, A117n.; MAN 5: 542). I use “apperception” mainly in the first sense.
“[Pure apperception] is that self-consciousness which…produces the representation
This is labeled the “apperception principle”; see Cramer (
For Kant, “act” (
Kant usually employs temporal expressions in a transcendental or logical sense. For example, “A precedes B” means that A is (transcendentally or logically) presupposed by B (Refl 18: 611; A26, B523).
Kant sometimes misleadingly counts “the self” (B68, A38/B55, A22–23/B37) or, equivalently, “the (thinking) I” (A342/B400, A361) as the object of inner sense. Nevertheless, the self cannot be represented as an object in an intuition (A22–23/B37, B406ff.). The object of empirical inner intuition is rather an inner state (A22–23/B37, A98–99, A107, A370–371; see
For inner sense, see
One may object that empirical apperception is defined as “the empirical consciousness of the identity of these reproductive representations with the appearances through which they were given, hence in recognition” (A115). Thus, empirical apperception would involve recognition, a spontaneous act, whereas inner sense should be totally receptive. However, this quotation does not concern empirical apperception, but the “empirical use” (A115) of pure apperception, which is responsible for that spontaneous act. Pure and empirical apperception constitute the formal and the material aspects, respectively, of (apperceptive) consciousness or apperception (Anth 7: 141–142;
Several passages indicate that we can intuit our acts of thinking by inner sense, for instance: “yet what can I think of as inner accidents except for those which my inner sense offers me? – namely that which is either itself thinking or which is analogous to one” (A265–266/B321); “thinking and willing are merely objects of inner sense” (V-Met-L1/Pölitz 28: 279). See also A371, A682–683/B710–711; Refl 18: 319; V-Met-L1/Pölitz 28: 222; as well as footnotes 23 and 49 below. Similarly, see Dyck (
See also Refl 18: 610–611. The texts at B276–277 and B
Admittedly, categories cannot apply to inner intuitions in order to determine the self, as there are no intuitions of the self (A22/B37, A382). Nevertheless, some categories are applicable to determining inner states, otherwise Kant would not mention inner appearance (A107, B506n.; Prol 4: 334–337) and inner experience (B
Similarly, Howell (
At B67–68, Kant refers to the act that affects inner sense as “this positing of [the mind’s] representation” in time. This is precisely the transcendental synthesis of imagination. Some passages suggest that any thought affects inner sense (Anth 7: 161). If this were true, obscure thoughts, which cannot affect inner sense, would be impossible (MS 6: 345, 376; also see §4.1 below).
Hannah (
Similarly, see Prien (
Cf. Longuenesse (
I follow Pluhar’s translation. Compare Guyer and Wood’s translation—“i.e., a perception”—which indicates that a perception is an indeterminate empirical intuition. This conflicts with the expression “an indeterminate perception” in Q3.4.
For more on this, see Kemp Smith (
The
Similarly, see Zobrist (
See also Refl 18: 611. For related controversies, see Kraus (
I construe the second half of the quotation as “determine the object of [inner] perception through the category [of existence]” (similarly, see
Similarly, see Frank (
The other passage at B420 coheres with my reading. Longuenesse (
Similarly, see Frank (
I claim that the
See also Frank (
I thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
A397, A259/B314; KU 5: 171; ÜE 8: 195. See also Baumgarten (
See also §3.4.
Reuscher (
“Experience” in combination with “subjective” or “conscious” is employed in a contemporary sense, signifying an inner state with some phenomenal character.
Crone (
Longuenesse (
The real “corresponds to it [the sensation] in
E.g., Refl 15: 268, 688–689; Refl 14: 113; V-Met-L1/Pölitz 28: 265 (mid-1770s). Note that in
Dyck (
See Klemme (
Rosefeldt (
Logic is “the formal rules of
For another criticism, see Longuenesse (
The consciousness whose deficiency makes a representation obscure is the subject’s empirical, temporal consciousness of being in this particular representational state (Anth 7: 135–136; UD 2: 290; Refl 16: 80; V-Lo/Pölitz 24: 510). This is, by definition, what inner sense provides (§2.2), i.e., the inner perception DEI. See Liang (
One could be aware of obscure representations indirectly, e.g., by inference (Anth 7: 135; V-Met/Mron 29: 879; V-Met-L1/Pölitz 28: 227), attention shifts (V-Anth/Mron 25: 1239) or altering perceptual conditions (Anth 7: 135). See Liang (
For attention and inner perception, see Merrit & Valaris (
If one accepts that (a) acts of thinking can be intuited, one must also accept that (b) thinking, as far as its appearance is concerned, is a temporal process. This is because if acts of thinking can be intuited, they must be represented in time, the form of inner sense. Therefore, all arguments for (a) in fn 13 are also indirect arguments for (b). One could cite the last passage at Refl 18: 319 from the famous Reflection 5661, objecting that thinking is not experienced (empirically cognized) in time. Nevertheless, a sentence preceding this passage indicates the opposite: “the thought itself,
Here, I follow the mainstream descriptivist interpretation of the
I denote the sum of the subject’s conscious experience at a given moment as a “conscious state.” This consists of all “conscious inner states” at this moment, e.g., perceptions, thoughts, desires, or moods.
Against the standard view about empirical apperception, Janum Sethi has recently drawn attention to a particular case: one can be aware of a series of empirical intuitions “related merely through association” (henceforth, “subjective sequences,” or “SS”; see
The
Allison (
Allison (
In other words, one is not only aware of the thought’s content but also aware of the mental activity responsible for it.
Allison (
Some remarks suggest the opposite, e.g., the beginning sentence of §25 (B157). However, in that context, Kant is addressing a mere “thought of something existing” (B277). As such, “I think myself only as I do every object in general from whose kind of intuition I abstract” (B429; see also NTKrV 23: 42–43). Thus, without any empirical base, “I am” cannot be an empirical cognition (B277; NTKrV 23: 42–43), i.e., it cannot be truth-apt.
He moves from the circumstance that “I think” entails “I exist thinking” to the conclusion that “I think” is empirical.
Even thinking of mental acts under a minimal description such as “something mental” requires that the subject can distinguish them from “something nonmental.”
Liang (
For another line of argumentation reaching a similar position, see Dickerson (
Their content is pure due to the nature of the intellectual consciousness.
Rosefeldt (
“Representation,” typically denoting a representational mental state, occasionally also signifies its intentional content, e.g., “all objects in space are…representations of our sensory intuition” (Prol 4: 288; see also A490–491/B518–519;
Cf. Kraus (
Note that, here, Kant equates apperception with consciousness.
The subject also self-ascribes intuitions and hence perceptions (A382).
For further evidence, see A398, B426–427. Similarly, see Koßler (
Anth 7: 131; Refl 15: 63; V-Anth/Mron 25: 1239. See also Liang (
IEI is also described as an “inner perception” (Q2) or “indeterminate perception” (Q3). One may raise the concern that a perception, by definition, contains consciousness (B160, 207, A120), and hence, IEI cannot be obscure. However, consciousness is gradated; some obscure representations can contain weak consciousness (B414, B414–415n., A104). IEI belongs to such obscure representations, since by means of it, the subject can be vaguely aware of “something real” that can be thought of as “an existing thing” (Q3.4). Consequently, IEI legitimately counts as a perception. For “obscure perception,” see LH103–104.
It could be suggested that in introspection, one’s attention is directed on one’s current inner states. In the focus of attention, one perceives one’s inner states and simultaneously determines this perception through some (higher-order) cognitive acts (B156n.). In the periphery, one could still have an obscure indeterminate inner intuition (IEI) of such acts, which motivates a higher-level, obscure
One may object that “I think
Cf. Longuenesse (
MAN 4: 542. See also Rosefeldt (
Q1.1 and B276–277 remarkably both echo and contrast with Q3.2. In Q1.1 Kant maintains that the “I think” that contains “I exist thinking” and is grounded on DEI “determines the subject…in regard to existence.” DEI represents its object “as appearance.” At B276–277, the
Rosefeldt (
The expression “precedes” in Q3.2 indicates a difference in stages.
Klemme (
The conjunction “and” in Q3.3 indicates that Q3.3 offers a further reason for the indeterminacy of IEI.
See
Cf. Kraus (
Thinking in general does not contain any predicate or “mark” (Log 9: 58) by which it could refer to an object. In “thinking in general,” we abstract from “all reference…to any object” (A397; ÜE 8: 195; Log 9: 13).
Cf. Kraus (
Cf. Liang (
Oberst (
Through inner experience, “I am…conscious of the existence of my soul in time, which I cognize only as an object of inner sense through the appearances constituting an inner state” (Prol 4: 336; see also Prol 4: 334; A443/B471; Kraus (
Recall the expressions “precedes” in Q3.2 and “not yet a category” in Q3.3. Although §4.4.1 provides a general reason why IEI is not determined by categories, this section gives a reason specific to the category of existence. There exists such a reason because IEI occasions an illusory use of this category: the IEI itself “signifies…something real, which was given…as something that in fact exists” (Q3.4). In contrast, IEI does not occasion a similar use regarding other categories.
Kraus (
Additionally, one is, as said, “seldom even conscious of” synthesis (A78/B103; A103–104); hence, one normally does not have phenomenal consciousness of one’s synthetical acts (see also
Kant renders “Auffassungsvermögen” as “
I am grateful to two anonymous referees for their valuable suggestions, as well as the audiences at workshops held at Nanjing University and Tsinghua University. I would also like to thank the organizers of those events, Xingming Hu and Asher Jiang, for their helpful comments and feedback on earlier versions of this paper. Additionally, special thanks go to Wei Cheng for his advice. This research was supported by a grant from the Beijing Municipal Social Science Fund (Grant No. 22ZXC015).
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