@article{ergo 1125, author = {Ruobin Gong, Joseph B. Kadane, Mark J. Schervish, Teddy Seidenfeld, Rafael B. Stern}, title = {Deceptive Credences}, volume = {7}, year = {2021}, url = {https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/1125/}, issue = {0}, doi = {10.3998/ergo.1125}, abstract = {<p>A familiar defense of Personalist or Subjective Bayesian theory is that, under a variety of sufficient conditions, asymptotically—with increasing shared evidence—<i>almost surely</i>, each non-extreme, countably additive Bayesian opinion, when updated by conditionalization, converges to certainty that is veridical about the truth/falsity of hypotheses of interest. Then, with probability 1 over possible evidential histories, personal probabilities track the truth. In this note we examine varieties of failures of these asymptotics. In an extreme case, conditional probabilities are <i>deceptive </i>when they converge to certainty for a false hypothesis. We establish that proposals for so-called “modest” credences, offered by Elga (2016) and by Nielsen and Stewart (2019) in response to a concern about Bayesian <i>orgulity </i>raised by Belot (2013), instead support <i>deceptive </i>credences. We argue that <i>deceptive</i> credences are not <i>modest</i>, but for a reason different than Belot adduces.</p>}, month = {10}, issn = {2330-4014}, publisher={Michigan Publishing Services}, journal = {Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy} }