TY - JOUR AB - <p>Some of Hume’s central arguments in the <i>Treatise</i>—for example, arguments about causality, the self, and motivation—concern which of our perceptions represent, and what these perceptions can and cannot represent. A growing body of literature aims to reconstruct the <i>theory of mental representation</i> that (it is presumed) underwrites these arguments. The most popular type of interpretation says that, according to Hume’s theory, copying plays a significant role in explaining mental representation. This paper raises two challenges to such interpretations. First, they cannot be squared with <i>Treatise </i>Book 2’s account of passions formed via sympathy (hereinafter, <i>sympathetic passions</i>). Second, Hume’s treatment of copying and representation in his later works differs significantly from that of the <i>Treatise</i>, and provides no clear evidence that the mature Hume accepted a theory of mental representation based on copying.</p> AU - Jonathan Cottrell DA - 2021/12// DO - 10.3998/ergo.1141 IS - 0 VL - 8 PB - Michigan Publishing Services PY - 2021 TI - Representation and Copying in Hume’s <i>Treatise</i> and Later Works T2 - Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy UR - https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/1141/ ER -