@article{ergo 1143, author = {Aleks Knoks}, title = {Misleading Higher-Order Evidence, Conflicting Ideals, and Defeasible Logic}, volume = {8}, year = {2021}, url = {https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/1143/}, issue = {0}, doi = {10.3998/ergo.1143}, abstract = {<p>Thinking about misleading higher-order evidence naturally leads to a puzzle about epistemic rationality: If one’s total evidence can be radically misleading regarding itself, then two widely-accepted requirements of rationality come into conflict, suggesting that there are rational dilemmas. This paper focuses on an often misunderstood and underexplored response to this (and similar) puzzles, the so-called <i>conflicting-ideals view</i>. Drawing on work from defeasible logic, I propose understanding this view as a move away from the default meta-epistemological position according to which rationality requirements are strict and governed by a strong, but never explicitly stated logic, toward the more unconventional view, according to which requirements are defeasible and governed by a comparatively weak logic. When understood this way, the response is not committed to dilemmas.</p>}, month = {12}, keywords = {epistemic normativity,higher-order evidence,rationality ideals,defeasible logic,epistemic dilemmas}, issn = {2330-4014}, publisher={Michigan Publishing Services}, journal = {Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy} }