TY - JOUR AB - <p>My partner loves the experiences she gets from eating olives. I, on the other hand, hate the experiences I get from eating olives. We differ in tastes. But how <i>exactly </i>do we differ? In particular: do our taste experiences differ <i>phenomenologically</i>—do my olive-experiences <i>feel different</i> than my partner’s olive-experiences? Some philosophers have assumed that the answer is “no,” and have advanced important arguments which turn on this assumption. I argue that, contrary to what these philosophers assume, ordinary taste differences <i>do</i> involve differences in phenomenology. My olive-experiences feel different than my partner’s olive-experiences. I argue for this <i>phenomenal thesis</i> in stages. First, I argue that there is a link between our attitudes and our pleasures; second, I argue that there is a link between our pleasures and our phenomenology. Together, my conclusions link our attitudes and phenomenology in a way that vindicates the phenomenal thesis. Along the way, I fend off various worries about what the phenomenal thesis might entail. I show that it does not entail any form of radical subjectivism, nor does it entail that there is a “distinctive feeling of pleasure.” I close by considering how opponents of the phenomenal thesis might retreat to a weaker thesis: one which concerns <i>extraordinary</i> taste differences, as opposed to ordinary taste differences. I argue that there are no obviously sound arguments for even this weaker thesis, which should make us all the more confident in the phenomenal thesis.</p> AU - Daniel Pallies DA - 2022/12// DO - 10.3998/ergo.2225 IS - 0 VL - 8 PB - Michigan Publishing Services PY - 2022 TI - How Do We Differ When We Differ In Taste? T2 - Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy UR - https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/2225/ ER -