Article

Bad Concepts, Bilateral Contents

Author
  • Michael Deigan (Rutgers University)

Abstract

I argue that one need not be an inferentialist in order to model inconsistent concepts, contrary to what some have thought. Representationalists can do so by adopting a form of bilateralism about contents. It remains unclear, however, why conceptual inconsistency would constitute a defect to be eliminated, rather than a vindication of dialetheism to be embraced. I suggest some answers to explore that involve accepting a descriptive form of dialetheism but denying its normative forms.

How to Cite:

Deigan, M., (2022) “Bad Concepts, Bilateral Contents”, Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8: 46. doi: https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.2247

Downloads:
Download PDF
View PDF

191 Views

98 Downloads

Published on
29 Dec 2022
Peer Reviewed