Commemorative Artefactual Speech

2.1. Subject

In the context of commemorative artefacts, the subject typically refers to an individual—for instance, Christopher Codrington, Edward Colston, or Winston Churchill, among others. However, the subject can also refer to a group of individuals (for instance, soldiers who fought for the Confederacy, or in a particular war), or to events (for instance, Independence Day, the end of war, and so on). Insofar as my interest is in giving an account of the speech of commemorative artefacts in general, I take a broad view of the referent of the subject of commemoration.

2.2. Artefact

The presentation of the subject in commemorative artefacts can vary. Commemorative artefacts typically comprise a direct representation of the subject (as when certain individuals are commemorated). However, they may comprise indirect representations of the subject (for instance, when the statue of a single soldier represents soldiers in general). They may also be non-representational (for instance, when an obelisk is established to commemorate dead soldiers). The form of the commemorative artefact can also vary. Commemorative artefacts can be tangible (such as money or memorials), or they can be intangible (such as sermons or songs). Of course, the speech of intangible commemorative artefacts can often be relatively less permanent compared to those of tangible commemorative artefacts. But a commemorative artefact can still be used for commemorative artefactual speech even if it is transient.

2.3. Importance

A commemoration, in its most basic sense, declares the importance of remembering a subject. This declaration is typically public, and often official—in the sense of being backed by common institutions. The relevant sense of importance may be cashed out in different ways. It may be important to remember the subject because of their significant achievements, because they made significant contributions to the group, or because their actions (almost/could have/indeed) adversely affected the group. The commemoration of the subject can take different forms. Typically, commemorative artefacts honour the subject—as in coins, stamps or statues dedicated to various people. They can sometimes repudiate or humiliate the subject—as in Guy Fawkes in the United Kingdom, or Qin Hui and Lady Wang in China. They can also lament the subject—as in the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Wall in the United States. Regardless of the specific form of commemoration, these artefacts are engaged in commemorative artefactual speech.⁴

A further indication of the importance of remembering the subject of commemoration, is found in a further feature of commemorative artefacts. They are typically not set up as snapshots or records of a community’s valuational attitudes towards a subject at a certain point in time. Instead, they are designed and intended to speak in perpetuity.⁵ Indeed, many of them are accompanied by inscriptions to that effect—such as “Lest we forget” on war memorials—or public statements explicitly stating the importance of remembering the subject in perpetuity. This intention also explains the choice material for many commemorative artefacts. Typically, very durable materials are chosen for such artefacts—metal, stone, and the like—to convey that the speech is intended to persist through time, and serve as (often literally) concrete reminders for future generations (Nguyen 2019: 978).

2.4. Authorisation

Another paradigmatic feature of commemorative artefactual speech is that it is made by a member of the group who possess the right kind of authorisation to engage in commemoration (a “commemorator”).⁶ For my purposes, it is enough to adopt a basic view—authorised commemorators are representatives who speak on behalf of others in public (Pitkin 1967). This authorisation can be official—as when the position that the commemorator occupies is undergirded by formal (and often institutionalised) rules. This can include democratically elected public officials of, or even institutions within, the group. More broadly, the commemorator can even be the state (Tsai 2016). The authorisation can also be informal, as when someone purports to speak on behalf of all who identify as members of a certain group, or who share certain experiences.

There are many competing accounts about what representation comprises, each of which are accompanied by several problems (Dovi 2018). One of the most common problems, is how to specify representation in a way that does not exclude the views of some (typically minority or marginalised) members of a group. Here, I do not defend any specific account of representation, or any solutions to the problems faced by such an account. That is because we do not need any specific account of representation to understand the structure of commemorative artefactual speech. We can plug in whichever theory of representation we prefer into my account of commemorative artefactual speech, without affecting its general structure. We may safely pass the buck.⁷

2.5. Identification

At a basic level, commemorative artefactual speech conveys the claim that the subject is on the whole worth of being commemorated. This basic commemorative artefactual speech can be relatively crude (Frowe 2019: 6). Its success need not turn on its audience successfully identifying any (or all) the specific features in virtue of which the subject is being commemorated. Indeed, most people’s interactions with commemorative artefacts are brief and shallow. Acknowledging this, many commemorative artefacts are designed—through their size or elevation, or the clarity of their depiction of the subject—to communicate at this basic level. That is, they deliver a basic point about the subject of commemoration, even if most other details are neglected.

However, commemorative artefacts also regularly identify and mention some feature in virtue of which a subject is being commemorated. As before, we should adopt a broad view of which features render any given subject commemorable. Different groups, and at different times, may reach different views about the set of such features. And depending on the content of the commemorative artefactual speech, these features can range from significant achievements or failures, remarkable exemplifications of virtues or vices, or simply being members of a certain class (such as the aristocracy), among others. Often, several features are identified and mentioned in the commemorative artefactual speech. For instance, significant achievements or failures are often easily connected to the virtues or vices of the subject. Thus, it is common to see commemorations of soldiers who perished in war mention not only their contribution to the war efforts, but also their bravery or willingness to sacrifice their lives for the country, or the values for which they fought, and so on.

The feature in concern need not be mentioned directly or explicitly. An example illustrates the point. The statue of Winston Churchill in Parliament Square in London portrays him standing atop a plinth with, simply, “CHURCHILL” inscribed on it. On the surface, this does not appear to identify or mention any feature of Churchill as commemorable. However, attending to the details of the statue reveals more information. First, the statue is located in Parliament Square, an open area before the Palace of Westminster that is home to statues of other well-known statespersons. Insofar as the statue of Churchill is situated in that space, it identifies and mentions his achievements as a statesperson.⁸ Second, the statue shows Churchill wearing a military greatcoat, and standing with his hand resting on his walking stick. This pose is based on, and refers to, a well-known photograph of Churchill inspecting the damages to the Palace of Westminster after it was bombed during the biggest air raid by Germany on London during the Second World War. Insofar as this knowledge was commonly available at the point of the commemoration, it would be obvious to the audience that Churchill’s achievements during the Second World War were being mentioned.

Two aspects of this example are generalisable. First, to fully understand commemorative artefactual speech, we must not attend to the commemorative artefact in isolation from its context. Referring to the earlier example, we see that an important part of understanding the commemorative artefactual speech of the statue of Winston Churchill, consists in grasping the prestige of it being established in Parliament Square, rather than in, say, a hotel lobby. More generally, it is against the backdrop of the context of the commemorative artefact, that we can identify the feature (or features) in virtue of which a subject is being commemorated. Second, the details of the commemorative artefact—especially how it is presented—are important for fine-grained identification of the feature (or features) in concern. Referring, again, to the earlier example, Churchill’s pose in the statue reveals that he is being commemorated not simply for his achievements as a statesperson in general, but also especially for his achievements during the Second World War. Conventions of sculpture and art can also help to clarify which features are being identified or mentioned. Decisions about the material used, the poses taken by the figures represented, their facial expressions, and so on, are often made with reference to such conventions—whether in accordance with, or in defiance of them (Scarre 2020: 24). For instance, it is common for commemorations of soldiers to present them in a “heroic” pose, as a way of highlighting their bravery and sacrifice (Savage 2009; 2018). The subtlety of such conventions means that the feature in concern can be identified and mentioned with a high level of granularity, at least by those who are aware of them.

Situating such artefacts in the relevant context, and attending to their details, reveals that commemorative artefactual speech can also be fine-grained, and even sophisticated. Of course, fully understanding the commemorative artefactual speech will, in many cases, require extensive knowledge. On this point, our intuitive thought in cases of ignorance is revealing. We do not think that the basic commemorative artefactual speech is all that there is. Instead, we think that there must be some feature of the commemorative artefact that can help us to precisely identify the feature in virtue of which a subject is being commemorated. Our ignorance impugns our full understanding of the commemorative artefactual speech, and not its structure.

2.6. Explanation

The identification and mention of the feature in question is typically accompanied by an explanation of how that feature is connected to commemorating the subject. However, such explanation need not be explicit. Often, it is enough to simply mention the feature, without needing to offer any explicit explanation. This is because commemorative artefactual speech (like speech in general) operates against a backdrop of common assumptions and understandings. In the context of commemorative artefactual speech, such understandings concern which features of persons or events are commemorable. This obviates the need to provide explicit explanations.

The redundancy of explicit explanations extends, perhaps surprisingly, to circumstances where such common understandings are absent. Suppose, for example, that a subject is being commemorated for a particular feature, in a context where few people (if any) make the connection between that feature and someone’s being commemorable. Even so, the commemorative artefactual speech of an artefact that commemorates the subject would be perfectly understandable as comprising two parts: the identification and mention of that feature, and an explanation of how that feature is connected to the subject being commemorated. Commemorative artefactual speech—at least in its basic form—succeeds upon the assumption that there is some plausible explanation. It does not require understanding what that explanation is. A stylised example illustrates the point. Suppose we encounter a commemorative artefact portraying some subject eating something, in a context absent common understandings about the connection between eating and one’s commemorability. Even so, we face no difficulty in understanding the commemorative artefact and speech at a basic level. We simply assume that there exists some plausible explanation for how that subject’s eating something is connected to commemorating them—perhaps because of their contribution to the food culture of the group, or the like. This assumption is, in part, licensed by (our knowledge of) the conventions of commemoration—that most if not all commemorative artefacts and speech are accompanied by some plausible explanation.

Despite the identification and mention of the feature in concern, the focus of the commemorative artefact usually remains squarely on the subject. Typically, the feature in concern is important insofar as it appears in an explanation for commemorating the subject. This makes intuitive sense—we are, after all, commemorating the subject. Briefly addressing an alternative view clarifies the point. We might think, upon looking at the statues in Parliament Square in London, think that the actual focus of those commemorations is on the feature of great statesmanship, rather than any given statesperson. That is, the commemorations of any given subject—and of similar subjects in general—serve only to indicate the significance of great statesmanship for the group. On this view, the subject is merely the “conduit” to the feature in concern. This view runs into a whole host of problems. Chief among them is a missing explanation for why any given subject has been selected for commemoration, rather than any other person possessing the feature in concern. That is, why do we commemorate only a few great statespersons, rather than all of them (whose lives and actions were important to the United Kingdom)?

In response to this, it is untenable to defend Feature Specificity—that the feature in concern is so specific (and, thus, so rare) that only a few subjects have ever possessed it. In the context of the statues in Parliament Square, there is no one feature that is so specific which is shared by all subjects, to the exclusion of others. Even the most specific formulation—great statesperson whose actions in a time of political crisis helped shape the course of British history for the better—is general enough to include many more historical figures than are actually commemorated, both in that specific space and in general across the country. Some explanation is still needed for why some members of this set are commemorated, while others are not. It is also unsatisfactory to assert Commemorative Promiscuity—that we are, and should be, prepared to commemorate anyone who possesses the feature in concern. Considering our commemorative practices, the claim that we are indeed thus prepared, is simply mistaken. The claim that we should be, while potentially useful for guiding future commemorations, features in an account of what commemorative artefactual speech should be, rather than an explanation of what it paradigmatically is.⁹

3.1. Unauthorised Speech

Commemorative artefactual speech can be problematic when the commemorator lacks the relevant authorisation. That is, members of the group reject the commemorator’s standing to speak on their behalf. This can be for a variety of reasons. At least in democratically structured groups, one such reason is the non-representativeness of the commemorator (or their views), with regards to the group as a whole (Kukla 2022: 245; Nguyen 2019: 979–980). It is important to note that the commemorator’s lack of standing may be fine-grained. Members of the group may regard the commemorator as lacking the standing to speak on their behalf on a specific issue (pertaining to the commemoration of a particular subject), without regarding them as lacking such standing on other issues. More broadly, insofar as commemorative artefactual speech involves representative speech, it is susceptible to the problems that plague representation more broadly.

3.2. Unfair Exclusion

Commemorative artefactual speech is problematic when it unfairly excludes some commemorable subject. An example illustrates the point. The Vietnam Veterans Memorial Wall commemorates the American soldiers who died in service during the Vietnam War. Even if we suppose that these soldiers are indeed commemorable, the commemorative artefactual speech and concern can nonetheless be problematic—it excludes people who are commemorable for the same reasons, such as Americans (especially women) who served as civilians or in non-combatant capacities, or soldiers from Allied nations, who likewise died in service during the Vietnam War. The addition of the Vietnam Women’s Memorial (dedicated to women who served during the Vietnam War), and grouping the two artefacts as part of a broader, Vietnam Veterans Memorial, goes some way in addressing this problem. Nonetheless, when taken on their own, the artefacts engage in unfair exclusions.¹⁰ We see here, then, that commemorative artefactual speech can be problematic not just by saying the wrong things, but also by failing to say all the right things. This imposes a fairly stringent requirement on commemorative artefactual speech, if it is to go well. In practice, most commemorative artefactual speech may be guilty of unfair exclusions.

More generally, a commemorative artefactual speech may be problematic if the subject of commemoration is a member of a group that has been historically and currently prioritised in commemorations, relative to members of other (especially marginalised) groups. This prioritisation may be in terms of the number of commemorative artefacts dedicated to the community to which the subject belongs, as when there are few (if any) commemorative artefacts dedicated to members of a minority group who nonetheless contributed to the group as a whole. Or it may be in terms of the relative prestige of the artefacts themselves or the sites in which they are established, as when the commemorative artefacts of members of minority groups are relatively trivial (such as stamps or small denominations of coins), or located in far-flung places in the country rather than near centres of power in the city. In such cases, the commemorative artefactual speech is problematic in virtue of being a part of, and contributing to, an exclusionary commemorative landscape.¹¹

3.3. Incorrect Identification

Commemorative artefactual speech goes astray when it identifies or mentions some feature that is not possessed by the subject. It can also be problematic when it refers to some subject that does not exist. For instance, the statue of John Harvard at Harvard University—upon which the words “JOHN HARVARD,” “FOUNDER,” and “1638” are inscribed—is known as the statue of three lies. First, the likeness of the statue is not actually that of John Harvard—no living representations of Harvard exist, and a different person’s likeness was used for the statue. Second, Harvard was not the founder but merely the first major benefactor. Third, Harvard University was founded in 1636; the year inscribed refers instead to the date of Harvard’s donation. While such cases can sometimes be accidental, often they are attempts to lie about the subject of commemoration. We might think of the numerous statues dedicated to soldiers of the Confederacy as being engaged in the latter project (Savage 2009; 2018; Upton 2015).

Diagnosing whether commemorative artefactual speech is problematic in these senses, requires background knowledge about the subject and whether they indeed possessed the features in concern. Where the relevant knowledge is absent—whether lost or deliberately obscured—the diagnosis may be difficult or even impossible to make. In practice, and especially in the case of ancient commemorative artefacts which we are ignorant of, the commemorative artefactual speech in question may not be fully understandable.

3.4. Aesthetic Inadequacy

Recall that the aesthetic features of a commemorative artefact can help us to identify and mention—and with greater granularity—the feature or features in virtue of which a subject is being commemorated. Commemorative artefactual speech can thus be problematic if these aesthetic features are inadequate for such purposes. This inadequacy can take a variety of forms; I briefly discuss two of them.

First, the aesthetic features of a commemorative artefact can be irrelevant to the feature in virtue of which a subject is being commemorated. Consider, for instance, The Embrace (established in 2022)—a commemoration of Martin Luther King Jr. and Coretta Scott King. The sculpture depicts four disembodied and intertwined arms, representing the hug that was shared by the Kings after the former was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1964. The Embrace has been widely criticised for its aesthetic failures—that it fails to depict the Kings in full, and that it is ugly and even appears pornographic when viewed from some angles. Moreover, and perhaps more pertinently, the artefact fails to specifically identify the Kings (or to adequately differentiate between them), and fails to identify the relevant feature or features of Martin Luther King that resulted in him being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize (insofar as his love for his wife does not seem relevant in such a way).

On a conciliatory note, we may think that the basic commemorative artefactual speech succeeds in cases such as this. Despite the absence of aesthetic details that can help us to identify the features in virtue of which a subject is commemorated, we nonetheless can secure the claim that the subject is on the whole worthy of commemoration. While this is plausible, an important mistake has nonetheless been made—which centres on the irrelevance of the aesthetic details to the commemorable feature. To sharpen the problem, consider a commemorative artefact honouring a public figure who dedicated their lives to charitable work, but which depicts them as engaging in their favourite hobby of fly-fishing. While this artefact may succeed in capturing something distinctive about their personality (or their person as a whole), it nonetheless fails to identify the features in virtue of which they are being commemorated. Our discontent with such an artefact suggests that the connection between the aesthetic details of the commemorative artefact, and the feature in virtue of which a subject is being commemorated, needs to be closely connected.¹²

Second, a commemorative artefact may be problematic if it fails to adhere to accepted aesthetic conventions—including those of commemoration it particular, but also sculpture or art more generally. Consider, again, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Wall. At the point of its creation, it was customary to commemorate soldiers by presenting them in the “heroic” pose, as a way of honouring their bravery and sacrifice. The Wall deviated from this convention—listing the names of deceased soldiers on black granite panels reminiscent of tombstones. In so doing, the Wall identifies and mentions their death sans glory. Its aesthetic features—especially their deviation from convention—was regarded as constitutive of its failure to make the “right” or “appropriate” kind of commemorative artefactual speech with regards to fallen soldiers. Because of this, the Wall was initially regarded as an insult to the soldiers—a “black gash of shame.” People tried to block the construction of the Wall. Indeed, the public outcry was so severe that a decision was made to erect an accompanying statue—Three Soldiers—near the Wall depicting three soldiers in line with the prevailing aesthetic conventions (Griswold 2007: 201–210; Savage 2009: 276). Of course, aesthetic conventions are neither static nor dictatorial. The Vietnam Veterans Memorial Wall was eventually regarded as making an appropriate kind of commemorative artefactual speech about soldiers. Accompanying such success is the possibility for future commemorative artefacts to mirror or reference the aesthetic features of the Wall.

3.5. Clandestine Explanation

Recall that the explanation of the relationship between a subject and the feature in virtue of which they are being commemorated, needs not be explicit. Where we lack the relevant knowledge, we tend to simply assume that there exists some plausible explanation of the connection between the feature in concern and a subject’s commemorability. This assumption is licenced by (our knowledge of) the conventions of commemoration. It is bolstered by the recognition that the commemorative artefactual speech is made by an authorised member of the group, and typically under the auspices of common institutions, or the state more generally. In practice, this tendency is ripe for abuse.

A commemorator could exploit the audience’s assumption that there exists some plausible explanation, to obscure the fact that there exists no accepted connection between a given feature and a subject’s commemorability. This sets a precedence for valuing that feature in a certain way—as being worthy of commemoration—if the latter does not already occur in the group. In so doing, the commemoration adds—and induces its audience to assume as plausible—a claim about the connection between the feature in concern and one’s commemorability, to the group’s common ground—the set of propositions (among others) shared by the members of the group. The optionality of providing an explicit explanation, means that the commemorative artefactual speech’s contribution to the common ground could be made under-the-radar, or through the back-door (Langton 2018). This optionality can also mask the potential controversiality of the connection between the feature in concern and one’s commemorability. Subsequent commemorators may then rely on this to push through the commemoration of some other subjects in virtue of their possession of that feature.

Here, it is important to note that the illicit character of such commemorative artefactual speech pertains only to its exploitation of this specific feature concerning the optionality of explanation. Such exploitation can serve progressive or regressive goals. A set of examples illustrate the point. Suppose that through an artefact, a commemorator honours a subject in virtue of caregiving, in a society where there exists no connection between caregiving and commemorability. If successful, they induce in their audience the belief in the plausibility of that connection. Other like-minded individuals can build upon this precedence to (slowly) dismantle people’s derisive attitude towards caregiving. Or suppose, in the other direction, that a commemorator honours a subject for their racist actions. Their commemorative artefactual speech could likewise contribute to a shift in the common ground. It is in this way that commemorative artefactual speech can sometimes be seen as self-fulfilling prophecies (Upton 2015: 20–21).

As should be clear, this abuse can also be present in circumstances where the connection between a given feature and one’s commemorability runs counter to existing beliefs within the group, or the beliefs of the group as a whole (as opposed to there being no such accepted connection). In these circumstances, a commemorator could disrupt or weaken the existing beliefs through their commemorative artefactual speeches. Again, such exploitation can serve progressive or regressive goals. A commemorator could commemorate a subject for their warring achievements in a society that has typically commemorated peacemakers, or they could do the reverse. A simplified example illustrates the point. Statues of Confederate soldiers in the United States were mostly established in the century after the Civil War, as “a bulwark against suggestions that white southerners had waged an immoral war while defending the institution of slavery, secession, and white supremacy,” and to rehabilitate the public perception of the moral character or virtues of those who fought for the Confederacy (Brundage, 2018: 325). Here, we may see these commemorative artefacts as attempting to establish the value and commemorability of those who are otherwise judged unfavourably.

3.6. Inappropriate Subject

The scenario that a given subject is not worthy of commemoration is the primary focus of extensive recent discussions of a certain class of commemorative artefacts (e.g. monuments and statues). It is claimed that such commemorative artefactual speech express contemptuous, derogatory, insulting, or even slurring views about certain individuals (especially in virtue of their group membership). Consider the statue of Winston Churchill in Parliament Square. Per our earlier discussions, it appears to only commemorate Churchill for his achievements as a statesperson during the Second World War. Nonetheless, this statue has been subject to multiple protests and vandalism attempts, on the basis that it expresses certain negative views. The challenge is to make sense of such claims on my account of commemorative artefactual speech.

To heighten the challenge, I posit that the problem with a commemorative artefactual speech directed at an inappropriate subject is distinct from the aforementioned problems. That is, it is not reducible to the commemorator’s lack of authorisation, or the speech’s unfair exclusion of commemorable others, incorrect identifications, or illicit explanations. Of course, any given commemoration of an inappropriate subject may also be guilty of these problems—in which case the problems with such commemorative artefacts are compounded.

Some background information about Churchill is relevant for specifying the problem. His ruthless policies led to a famine resulting in millions of deaths in Bengal in 1943. He responded to criticism of these policies by blaming the Bengalis for causing their own over-population. He also was a white supremacist. Further examples of his racism abound (Addison 1980; Limaye 2020). It is against the backdrop of such information about Churchill as a statesperson (or even more generally, as a person) that we should situate his commemoration. More generally, the claim that a subject is commemorable in virtue of some feature, is always made against the backdrop of their other features.

According to the discussions so far, the content of commemorative artefactual speech appears minimal—only that the subject is commemorable in virtue of some feature, where that feature is indeed commemorable (typically laudable), along with some explanation of the relationship between that feature and commemorability. Given this, it appears morally innocuous to commemorate—specifically, to honour—people like Churchill for their great statesmanship. Indeed, this appears to be the primary defence made by those seeking to preserve problematic commemorative artefacts, including that of Churchill. However, problems arise when we situate this commemorative artefactual speech in light of those morally or politically problematic features of a given subject—especially those that concern their responsibility for serious injustices. Choosing to focus on and honour a subject in virtue of a laudable feature, offers an implicit explanation of the relationship between that laudable feature and the subject’s problematic features. Specifically, that those problematic features are not significant enough to disqualify the subject as being worthy of honouring. In the context of the statue of Churchill, the commemorative artefactual speech offers the explanation that his racism and white supremacy are insignificant relative to his statesmanship during the Second World War, and do not disqualify him from being honoured. The existence of this explanation fits with, and is accounted for by, one of the aforementioned features of commemorative artefactual speech—that the focus remains squarely on the subject. In the case here, the commemorative artefactual speech is that Churchill is honourable despite whatever else he has done.¹³

We see, then, that the supposed minimal content of commemorative artefactual speech is an illusion. Even when commemorations of a given subject make explicit reference to some specific feature, they are nonetheless always made in the broader context of the other features of that subject. The commemoration of a given subject thus declares, in addition, that those other features are not significant enough to disqualify the subject’s being commemorated, and more generally, that they do not disqualify one’s commemorability. As should be clear, this is especially problematic when the commemoration of the subject takes the form of honouring them.

The additional claim concerning the relationship between these features can in some circumstances be connected to a broader view within a given group. Again, in the context of Churchill, we may see this claim as being arguably connected to a broader view—supported by public policies and the organisation of common institutions, among others—that systematically devalues or discriminates against certain individuals in virtue of their ethnic or racial membership. That a commemorative artefactual speech offers such an explanation may, in addition, be regarded as entrenching such a view—by way of reiterating the latter. The explanation is sometimes not kept implicit. In some circumstances, as with the Confederate monuments established to posthumously valorise the Confederate cause, it may be issued explicitly.

This explanation, if implicit, can in some circumstances be missed—such as when there is a lack of general knowledge about the subject of commemoration, or what they have done. As suggested above, this lack of general knowledge may be the result of loss across time, or of deliberate obfuscation. For instance, a systematic and pervasive whitewashing of Churchill’s life and actions in textbooks and public discourse, may lead the British public to neglect the explanation offered by the commemoration, and thus fail to notice the problematic character of the latter. That the explanation can be missed, however, is a separate issue from the fact that it has nonetheless been offered. In this narrow sense, commemorative artefactual speech can be morally and politically problematic even if no one picks up on the explanation.