Psychology became interested in character and virtues mostly with the introduction of the Positive Psychology movement, which was disenfranchised by the disease-oriented focus of the field. The movement of Positive Psychology broadened the scope of psychology by focusing on cultivating good qualities (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2014). The pioneer of the positive psychology movement, Martin Seligman, challenged the “disease model” to psychology and emphasized the need for studying human strengths and virtues (Peterson and Seligman, 2004).

In their pursuit of classifying and assessing the strengths and virtues, Seligman and colleagues used the examples of the DSM and ICD to formulate “a manual of the sanities” instead (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). They defined virtues as the core characteristics that both moral philosophers and religious scholars valued. In generating the universal virtues list, they limited their search to the written texts of ancient civilizations that have had an enduring impact on human history, including the Islamic civilization with their pursuit of classifying character and virtue. The final list that was created by Peterson and Seligman (2004) included six core virtues: wisdom, courage, justice, humanity, temperance, and transcendence. It is noteworthy that four out of these six virtues, namely wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice, overlap with the four cardinal virtues identified by Plato, Aristotle, Christian, and Islamic scholars in their respective literature (Aristotle, Ross, & Brown, 2009; Plato, 1943; Aquinas, 1981, Summa Theologica qs. 61). Peterson and Seligman (2004) called what were historically sub-virtues under each cardinal virtue “character strengths” (Linley and Harrington, 2006). They described these character strengths as psychological processes or mechanisms that were expressions and displays of the cardinal virtues. Character strengths were then referred to as Values in Action (VIA) and included 24 strengths of character, such as curiosity, honesty, and love, among others, and were clustered into the six categories of virtues (Peterson & Seligman, 2004).

Since the initial conversation on Positive Psychology, psychologists have increasingly become more interested in character and the virtues given the salutary psychological effects of displaying good character on various aspects of wellbeing. Character strengths have been found to be correlated with higher levels of wellbeing in various stages of life, including adolescence and adulthood. Linley and Harrington (2006) state that the usage of character strengths leads individuals to feel good about themselves and increases the likelihood of achieving their goals and reaching their full potential. Bromley et al. (2006) found that adolescents with numerous personality strengths at the mean age of 16 were at a decreased risk of developing psychiatric disorders, educational and occupational problems, interpersonal difficulties, and criminal behaviors at the mean age of 22. Gilham et. al. (2011) found that character strengths predict lower levels of depression and greater life satisfaction during adolescence. In studies conducted with adult participants, character strengths were found to correlate with life satisfaction and happiness at varying degrees (Park, Peterson, and Seligman, 2004; Peterson et. al., 2007). One of the important virtues related to life satisfaction found in the VIA is transcendence or spirituality (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). Cloninger (2004) too argues that taking a spiritual approach to well-being leads to lasting satisfaction and health for those who desire deeper meaning in their lives amidst the inevitable challenges of life. Finding hope and meaning through spirituality can reduce psychological vulnerability and increase resilience to psychopathology. Garcia, Lester, Cloninger, & Cloninger (2017) created the Temperament and Character Inventory (TCI), a personality assessment instrument that theorizes that personality is composed of unconscious and automated temperamental qualities that interact with three conscious and deliberate character components: self-directedness, cooperativeness, and self-transcendence. Cloninger & Zohar (2011) conducted a study that explored the relationship between character traits on health and happiness. They found that the character trait of self-directedness was strongly related to happiness, satisfaction with life, general health, and perceived social support. Cooperativeness was related with perceived social support while having a weak relationship with other well-being dimensions. Self-transcendence was related to positive emotions but not related to other well-being dimensions. Seligman et al. (2005) found that acting upon character strengths in different ways every day for a week increased levels of happiness and decreased depressive symptoms for 6 months. In a study of stress regarding COVID, an acute disease in humans caused by the coronavirus, character strengths moderated the effect of COVID-related stress on wellbeing, with higher total score of character strengths resulting in weaker effects of stress on well-being (Umucu et. al., 2021). This literature establishes the association between character strengths and certain aspects of wellbeing. Ryan and Deci (2001) proposed that the study of well-being is rooted in two distinct philosophies: eudaimonism and hedonism. One of the current well-being theories that combine eudaimonic and hedonic aspects of happiness is Seligman’s well-being theory (Wagner et al., 2020). Seligman’s theory has five dimensions, including positive emotion, engagement, positive relationships, meaning, and achievement, abbreviated as PERMA (Seligman, 2011). In a recent study, Wagner et al. (2020) looked at the association between character strengths and a comprehensive model of well-being. Wagner et al. (2020) looked at the relationship between character strengths and the five dimensions of PERMA and found, apart from modesty and prudence, that all character strengths were positively related to PERMA dimensions, with effect sizes varying from small to large. Given the demonstrated association between well-being and utilization of character and virtues, a significant project was launched at Oxford, known as the Oxford Character Project, to create a model for the cultivation of virtues (Lamb, Brant & Brook, 2021). This project is a synthesis of recent research in education, philosophy, and psychology rooted in seven Aristotelian strategies of character development. The seven approaches included: habituation through practice, reflection on personal experience, engagement with virtuous exemplars, dialogue that increases virtue literacy, awareness of situational variables, moral reminders, and friendships of mutual accountability. Accordingly, there is an increasing interest and involvement of psychologists in the creation of programming for the cultivation of character in educational settings.

The classifications of virtues in the Islamic literature begins with their inheritance of the Hellenistic philosophical tradition. More specifically, the works of Plato (d. 348 BCE), Aristotle (d. 322 BCE), and Galen (d. 216 BCE) was introduced to Muslim scholars in the early 9th century with the establishment of the bayt al-hikmah or House of Wisdom in Baghdad by the then Caliph Mamun (d. 211 AH/833 CE). This introduction initiated a large project of translating early Greek philosophical works into Arabic to make them accessible to Islamic scholars (Sourdel, 2022). His successor Caliph al-Mu’tasim (d. 220 AH/842 CE) appointed the famous philosopher-physician Al-Kindī (d. 259 AH/873 CE) to the bayt al-ḥikmah to oversee these translation projects (Najati 1993). The most notable Greek works that drew the greatest attention of Islamic scholars was Plato’s Republic and Timaeus and Laws, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, and Galen’s Peri Ethon (Fakhry, 1991, pp. 95–97). This led to a series of treatises by Muslim scholars who adapted, refined, and further developed Aristotle’s and Galen’s views and typologies of virtues. Among the earliest of them was the famous philosopher-physician Abū Bakr al-Rāzī (d. 303 AH/925 CE), who was appointed by Caliph al-Muktafī (d. 286 AH/908 CE) as the medical director of one of the earliest documented hospitals in human history in Baghdad (Tbakhi & Amr, 2007). He wrote a treatise entitled Tibb al-Rūḥānī, translated as the Health of the Soul, discussing character, virtues, and modalities of acquiring good character (al-Rāzī, 1978). In this work, he draws extensively from Galen, even summarizing and citing him explicitly in his book. Later, Abū ʿAlī ibn al-Miskawayh’s (d. 421AH/1030 CE) wrote his work entitled, Tadhīb al-Akhlāq, translated as Refinement of Character, where he very evidently drew from Aristotle in his classification of virtues and vices (ibn Miskawayh, 2006). Shortly after, Imam Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, the famous Sunni polymath, also drew extensively from this literature in his iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn, translated as Revival of the Religious Sciences, relying extensively on ibn al-Miskawayh’s work (al-Ghazālī, 2011). While al-Ghazālī critically adopted many of the previous discussions of character, he situated them within the context of scripture. Al-Ghazālī, as witnessed by other Sufi’s like him, viewed vices essentially as spiritual diseases of the heart and discussed both vices and virtues through extensive scriptural references. Approximately one hundred years later, the famous philosopher Naṣīruddīn al-Ṭūsī’s (672 AH/1274 CE) wrote his treatise on the same topic, calling it The Naṣīrī Character or akhlāq al-Nāṣirī (al-Tūsī, 2007). Al-Tūsī and ibn al-Miskawayh’s works became the most widely cited and relied upon works regarding classifications of virtue and vices until ʻAḍudīn al-Ījī (d. 756 AH/1355 CE), approximately one hundred years later, penned a very concise and comprehensive summary of the works that preceded him in his al-Akhlāq al-ʻaḍudiyyah (al-Ījī & Taşköprizade, 2018). While this work in Arabic is approximately only 20 pages long, al-Ījī’s brilliance is in his ability to bridge the lengthy discussions of character into a short and comprehensive list with accompanying brief definitions for each. Al-Ījī is unique in that he is one of the discursive theologians (mutakallim), more widely known for his work in Sunni discursive theology (Kalām). As a result, the theological undertones reflected in his modifications to the preceding typologies of virtues and vices, and their accompanying definitions, is evident (Salem, 2022). This work becomes a relied upon work, so much so that it later became a part of the Ottoman madrasa curriculum that was to be memorized by students. Many scholars later took this as the central text for virtues and made extensive references to it. For example, Imam al-Birgivī, the famous 16th century Ottoman theologian and Sufi of Tariqah Muhammadiyyah or the Muhammadan Way, in the opening of his section on diseases of the heart, quotes the al-akhlāq al-ʿaḍudiyah almost verbatim (al-Birgivī, 2011). Many commentaries are also written on the al-akhlāq al-ʿaḍudiyah. One of the most notable is the commentary written by the Ottoman scholar and chronicler, Aḥmad Taşköprizade (d. 939 AH/1561 CE) (Taşköprizade, 2014). The significant feature of the commentary is that it not only provides an explanation of the brief and abridged definitions of al-Ījī’s work but it also provides ample examples and proofs from the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth. Furthermore, Taşköprizade provides more than just commentary, adding his own contributions to al- Ījī’s work by identifying and classifying the two polar extremes, excesses (ifrāt) or deficiencies (tafrīt), of almost every sub-virtue. Given that virtues are viewed by Islamic scholars as the perfect moderation of human drives, Taşköprizade identifies and names the resultant two potential extremes of imbalanced virtues.

While Muslim scholars of various orientations emphasized the importance of personal virtue, they also made attempts, along with Muslim leaders, to disseminate and create virtue in society through intentional social interventions aimed at inculcating a virtuous community. For example, Al-Fārābī (d. 340 AH/951 CE) took Aristotle’s views on human conduct and broadened them to a create a political philosophy of the ideal state that paralleled Plato’s Republic in his acclaimed book, The Virtuous City (al-Farabi, 1985). The first documented top-down social interventions designed to motivate virtuous behavior in society can be seen in the futuwwah or Islamic Youth Ethics projects led by al-Nāsir li Din ilahi (al-Halveti, 1983). Futuwwah or Islamic Youth Ethics was and is a concept still prevalent among the Sufis or spiritual orders, and is a classification of the appropriate virtuous conduct of individuals that all Muslims should aim to acquire. Al-Nāṣir li Dīn ilāhī (d. 614 AH/1225 CE) took this very personal and spiritual aim and attempted to promote it in society to motivate collective virtue. He did so by delegating the responsibility of conducting public sermons, centered around the unified campaigning of virtues, by some of the most talented orators (al-Halveti, 1983). Later in the Ottoman era, futuwwah codes become associated with the various guilds of professionals, which is equivalent to professional associations or boards of ethics today. Such guilds were bound by a unique code of ethics drawn up for each profession known as futuwahnames (al-Halveti, 1983). This provided a common standard of ethical professional practice among professionals in that industry to protect them from unethical conduct and harm caused to their clients or customers.

The word khuluq and its plural akhlāq translates to character in the classical Islamic literature. Good character is known as the acquisition of virtues known as faḍāʾil and abstention from the vices known as radhāʾil. A person is said to have good character if a virtue becomes embedded within an individual and becomes a character trait (al-Ghazālī, 2011). This is indicated by that trait being habituated and action responses emerging with automaticity that does not need reflection, deliberation, or exertion (al-Ghazālī, 2011, 5/190; Taşköprizade, 2014, pg. 61; al-Ījī & Taşköprizade, 2018, pg. 38). Thus, character can be seen as more of an outcome, and character traits can be said to be those virtues or vices that have become embedded within the individual.

Islamic scholars adopt Aristotle’s drive theory, stating that human beings have three basic instincts: survival instincts (quwwah ghaḍabiyah), appetitive instincts (quwwah shahwiyah), and rational/intellectual instincts (quwwah ‘aqliyah/naṭiqah). Islamic virtue theorists view human well-being and optimal character formation as the perfect balance of these three instincts (al-Ghazālī, 2011, 5/194; al-Ījī & Taşköprizade, 2018, pg. 38). Accordingly, the theorists conceptualized three chief virtues resulting out of the perfect balance of these instincts: valor, the perfect balance of survival instincts: temperance, the perfect balance of appetitive instincts: and wisdom, the perfect balance of rational instincts. They also added a fourth virtue, justice; however, this is seen as a byproduct of the balanced formation of the former three instincts coming together (al-Ghazālī, 2011, 5/194; al-Ījī & Taşköprizade, 2018, pg. 38). Furthermore, the scholars have identified and classified several sub-virtues under each of these four chief virtues. For each virtue and most sub-virtues, there are the two polar extremes of excessiveness (ifrāṭ) or deficiency (tafriṭ) of that trait. Both extremes are seen as vices, and virtue is indicated by the perfect balance between the two extremes (see table 1).

While the Positive Psychology literature, Virtues in Action (VIA) questionnaire, based on both a model and classification of virtues, draws from Islamic literature, it does not serve as its foundation nor are the items of the questionnaire constructed to cater to the religious and cultural backgrounds of Muslim populations. Thus, this paper provides a reorganization and creation of a model of virtues that is inherently drawn from the Islamic character literature, with the hope that the foundations of this model will later become an inventory of Islamic virtues.

The construction of this new model is entitled Traditional Islamic Virtues (TIV), and it provides a classification of virtues relying primarily on ʿAdudīn al-Ījī’s work.

Preserved and aggregated sub-virtues: The three virtues of clarity of mind (Safā’ al-dhihn), sound comprehension (Jawda al-fahm), and sound conceptualization (husn al-tasawwur) were integrated under the new virtue of discernment in the TIV due to their closeness in meaning.

Removed sub-virtues: The four sub-virtues of fluid intelligence (dhakāʾ), ease of learning (suhūla al-taʿlīm), memory (hifz), and memory recall (al-dhukru) were all removed given their higher loadings on aptitude and genetics as demonstrated by the psychological literature (Goriounova & Mansvelder, 2019).

Added sub-virtues: Four additional sub-virtues were added. The first is discernment (Jawda al-Fahm wa al-Taṣawwur) and is defined as the ability to use reason, process information logically, and demonstrate critical thinking (Ibn Miskawayh, 2006, p. 37; al-Tūsī, 2007, p. 93; Ali, 2007, p. 105; al-Ghazālī, 1961, p. 27.). The second added sub-virtue was love of learning (ḥubb al-taʿllum) and is described as the adoration for learning and value for the acquisition of knowledge (Ibn Miskawayh, 2006, p. 37; al-Tusī, 2007, p. 93). The prophetic statement, “You should be a scholar, or a student, or a listener, or a lover of knowledge and scholars, and you should not be the fifth which makes you perish. ‘Ata’ said, Mis’ar said to me: You added a fifth point which we do not have. The fifth point is: To hate ‘knowledge and its people” (Tabarānī, 1973; Bayḥaqī, n.d., ḥadīth 277), provides a strong rationale for the addition of this sub-virtue and involves more of an attitude toward learning. The third sub-virtue added is knowledge acquisition (ihtimām bi al-taʿllum) and is defined as the continuous engagement in activities of learning and pursuit of knowledge acquisition (Ibn Miskawayh, 2006, p. 37; al-Tusī, 2007, p. 93; Ali, 2007, p. 105). The following prophetic statement also served as a supportive basis for its addition: “Two things that [when one is engaged in them] are never satiated, one who is absorbed in knowledge is never satiated with it and the one who is absorbed in the world (dunyā) is never satiated by it” (al-Suyūtī, 2010, ḥadith number 130). This was also inspired by the prophetic statement, “Seeking knowledge is mandatory on every Muslim” (Ibn Mājah, 2007, ḥadīth 224). The fourth sub-virtue added is open-mindedness (tafattuḥ al-dhihn). This virtue is defined as the absence of intellectual stubbornness and possessing an openness to truth. The following Qur’anic statements provided the rationale for the addition of this sub-virtue: “And of the people is he who disputes about Allah without knowledge or guidance or an enlightening book [from Him]” (22:8). “When it is said to them, ‘Follow what Allah has revealed,’ they reply, ‘No! We only follow what we found our forefathers practicing.’ Would they still do so, even if their forefathers had absolutely no understanding or guidance?” (2:170).

Preserved sub-virtues: Six sub-virtues were preserved from al-Īji’s original list: modesty, orderliness, patience, patience or self-control, contentment, civility, and generosity. Modesty (ḥayaʾ) is defined by Ṭaşköprizāde in his commentary as a feeling of being too ashamed to partake in actions that are deemed sinful or unethical (Taşköprizade, 2014, pg. 81) and was adopted by the TIV. For orderliness (Intiẓām), al-Ījī’s description was adopted and he defined it “as the prioritization of matters and to rank order them according to their potential for good outcomes (maṣaliḥ)” (al-Ījī & Taşköprizade, 2018, pg. 40). Patience (sabr) was preserved, but relabeled as self-control (habs al-nafs) given that Ṭaşköprüzāde described it as, “the exercise of willpower to restrain oneself from engaging in sin,” and to distinguish it from patience, which is listed under Valor (Taşköprizade, 2014, pg. 81). This description was slightly broadened in the TIV and defined as “the exercise of willpower to restrain one’s appetitive drives and sensual desires.” Contentment (qanāʿah) was preserved and described as the process of being satisfied with the blessings that Allah has bestowed upon them without yearning for more (al-Māwardī, 1978, p. 224–225; al-Ghazālī, 2001, III, p. 237–238; al-Tusī, 2007, p. 96; Ali, 2007, p. 109.). Civility (muruʾa) was defined in the TIV as abstaining from uncivilized or lowly behavior in consideration of one’s social context and norms (Ali, 2007, p. 110; al-Tusī, 2007, p. 96; al-Isfahānī, 1987, p. 143; Ibn Hibban, 1977, p. 233–234). The Arabic term used by al-Ījī ḥusn ‌al-samt was relabeled as muruʾah due to its common usage and familiarity in Islamic vocabulary. Generosity (sakhāʾ) was retained and described in the TIV “as giving freely to others without expecting anything in return” (Taşköprizade, 2014, pg. 91; Ibn Miskawayh, 2006, p. 22; al-Tusī, 2007, p. 96; Ali, 2007, p. 110). There were six further subtypes of generosity listed by al-Ījī that were not included in the interest of maintaining brevity. We attempted to encompass the essence of them in the aforementioned descriptions.

Aggregated sub-virtues: The sub-virtue self-restraint (al-Daʿah), listed by al-Ījī, was removed, and included under self-control. The sub-virtue dignity (waqār) was described by al-Ījī and Taşköprizade as exercising self-restraint to avoid acting thoughtlessly or being reactionary to one’s environment (al-Ījī & Taşköprizade, 2018, pg. 40) and this too was subsumed under the TIV sub-virtue self-control. The virtue of integrity (al-Nazāha), listed by al-Ījī, was also included under the TIV sub-virtue self-control. Whereas the social dimensions of integrity, described by al-Ījī and Taşköprizade, which is “not transgressing or wronging others,” is covered under the TIV sub-virtue upholding the rights of others, as well as under the chief virtue of justice.

Added sub-virtues: The sub-virtue gratitude (Shukr) was added due to its close associations with and centrality in promoting psychological and spiritual health. It was defined as being thankful and showing appreciation for the blessings one possesses (al-Qushayrī, 1966, p. 489, 491–492; al-Ghazālī, 2001 IV, p. 60). The virtue gratitude is central to the virtues and character discussions contained both in the classical Islamic literature and modern psychology (Day, Roberty & Rafferty, 2020). Islamic scholars often place a special emphasis on this virtue. For example, Imam al-Ghazālī devoted a whole section to patience and gratitude in his Revival of the Religious Sciences (al-Ghazālī, 2001). While we recognize that in al-Ījī’s list, elements of it may have been contained within other items, the authors felt it was important enough to separate it as a sub-virtue.

Preserved sub-virtues: Seven of al-Ījī’s sub-virtues listed under the chief virtue of valor were preserved in the TIV, albiet with slightly different definitions. This first is patience (ṣabr), which was defined as the ability to endure the challenges associated with undertaking a difficult task and waiting calmly for the outcomes to come to fruition (al-Ghazālī, 2001, IV, p. 63; al-Qushayrī, 1966, II, p. 461; Ibn Miskawayh, 2006, p. 21; Ibn Hazm, 2007, p. 27; al-Tusī, 2007, p. 95; Ali, 2007, p. 108.). Second is forbearance (ḥilm), described as the ability to restrain one’s anger and overlook the faults of others. Also, to refrain from the execution of retribution and to respond to evil with goodness (al-Isfahānī, 1987, p. 342; Ibn Hibban, 1977, p. 209; Ibn Miskawayh, 2006, p. 23; Ali, 2007, p. 106; al-Tusī, 2007, p. 94; al-Ghazālī, 2001, III, 179–180). Third is humility (tawāẓu), described as the quality of having a modest or moderate view of one’s self-importance and having no traces of arrogance in their social dealings (Ibn Miskawayh, 2006, p. 23; al-Tusī, 2007, p. 93–94; Ali, 2007, p. 106; al-Isfahānī, 1987, p. 299; al-Qushayrī, 1966, I, 380, 433.). Fourth is protectiveness (ḥamiyya), described as the possession of an adaptive feeling of anger and accompanying assertive response to threats to that which is sacred (al-Tusī, 2007, p. 93–94; Ali, 2007, p. 106; Ibn Miskawayh, 2006, p. 23; al-Isfahānī, 1987, p. 347; al-Ghazālī, 2001, I, 318; II, 38–39; III, 167–169). Fifth is compassion (riqqa), described as having a soft heart or a feeling of sympathy for the painful experiences of others leading them to displays of forgiveness, tolerance, and benevolence (Ibn Miskawayh, 2006, p. 22; Ali, 2007, p. 106; al-Tusī, 2007, p. 94.). Sixth is agreeableness (muwāfaqa), defined as being amenable to others preferences in social contexts and willingness to give up their wishes for others in trivial or worldly things (Ali, 2007, p. 109; al-Tusī, 2007, p. 95; Ibn Hazm, 2007, p. 48, 62, 75; Ibn Miskawayh, 2006, p. 22; Ibn Hibban, 1977, p. 215–223). This item was listed as rifq by al-Ījī and was relabeled muwāfaqa in Arabic in preference for the term utilized by the Sufis and the Islamic spiritual ethics codes (futuwwah) (al-Halveti, 1983). Seventh is courage (najda), described as a display of appropriate assertiveness in order to protect individual rights and to respond with bravery to circumstances that demand a firm response (Ibn Miskawayh, 2006, p. 23; Ibn Hazm, 2007, s. 32, 59; al-Māwardī, 1978, p. 244–245, 249; al-Tusī, 2007, p. 93–94; Ali, 2007, p. 106).

Aggregated sub-virtues: The sub-virtue resolve (shahāma), described by al-Ījī as a swiftness and determination to do good things, was reconceived as the sub-virtue perseverance, preferring the Arabic term ʿuluw al-himmah that was utilized by Kinalzade (Ali, 2007, p. 110). Perseverance is defined in the TIV as the ability to generate the will power and endurance to bear difficult tasks over a long period of time (al-Tusī, 2007, p. 96; Ibn Miskawayh, 2006, p. 23; al-Ghazālī, 2001, IV, 254–255). Al-Ījī’s sub-virtue endurance (iḥtimāl) was also included and combined with perseverance. Al-Ījī’s sub-virtue of serenity (sukūn), described by him as the maintenance of psychospiritual equilibrium during battles, was subsumed under the TIV sub-virtues of patience (sabr) and courage (najda). Al-Ījī’s sub-virtue of vast heartedness (kibar al-nafs) was included under the TIV sub-virtue of courage since it contains the meaning described by Taşköprizade, “being resilient and unshaken by circumstances to maintain psychospiritual equilibrium by not being drawn toward neither wealth nor poverty” (Taşköprizade, 2014).

Added sub-virtues: Only one new sub-virtue was added, which was keeping a good opinion of others (ḥusn al-dhan). This was defined as the ability to look at the positive qualities of individuals, depersonalize any offenses committed against them, and maintain an overall positive interpretation of others’ behavior. Keeping a good opinion of others is a central virtue found within the Islamic tradition. The Qur’an exhorts: “Oh you who believe, abstain from excessive [negative] assumption, for indeed some assumptions are evil” (49:12). This TIV sub-virtue is defined as, “The ability to look at the positive qualities of individuals, depersonalize any offenses committed against them and maintain an overall positive interpretation of others behavior” (Ibn Miskawayh, 2006, p. 24; al-Ghazālī, 2001, II, 325; III, 36, 150–153; IV, 144–145, 270).

Moved sub-virtues: We moved the sub-virtue of seeking and drawing affection (al-tawaddud) from the chief virtue justice to the chief virtue valor. While al-Ījī defined it as “seeking affection from others,” the authors have included giving affection as well for the TIV because other Islamic scholars also conceived of this item as including activities to attract the affection of others, as well as the creation of love between friends and family, through acts such as gift-giving and visiting one another (fatḥ al-bārī, 10/439).

Preserved sub-virtues: Al-Ījī’s sub-virtue loyalty (wafāʾ) was preserved, but it was redefined as “a commitment to fulfilling the needs of others and upholding one’s oaths and contracts.” By including the aspect of not violating one’s social or contractual obligations, the item was broadened to encompass aspects of husn al-sharika and, thus, it was partially subsumed under this category. The virtue of familial and social connection (Silat al-rahm) was described as, “maintaining the bonds of kinship and close friendship” (Ibn Miskawayh, 2006, p. 24; al-Māwardī, 1978, 150–154; al-Ghazālī, 2001, II, 192–221). This item was broadened from al-Ījī’s original definition to include friendships as well. The virtue of rectification (Islāḥ) was retained but redefined as fulfilling one’s civic duty to uphold the good and prohibit evil in society (ʾamr bi al-mʿarūf wa nahy ʿan al-munkar), as well as reconciling social relationships between people.

Aggregated sub-virtues: Al-Ījī’s sub-virtue of sincere friendship (sadāqa) was combined with and included under agreeableness (muwāfaqa), due to the quality of giving preference to friends and being amenable to their needs. The two sub-virtues compatibility (al-ulfa) and harm-reduction (shafaqa) were subsumed under the TIV sub-virtue agreeableness (muwāfaqa). Al-Ījī’s sub-virtue, excellence in partnership (ḥusn al-sharika), was partially encompassed under a new category of truthfulness (ṣidq). Al-Ījī’s sub-virtue of excellence in recompense (ḥusn al-qada), described by him as the capacity “to compensate others without causing them remorse or reminding them of one’s favors,” was included under generosity (sakhaʾ).

Removed sub-virtues: Al-Ījī’s sub-virtue of reciprocity (mukāfa’a), defined by al-Ījī as “the reciprocation of goodness with its like or better,” was removed due to its indirect relatation to the sub-virtues of agreeableness, compassion, and generosity.

Added sub-virtues: A new sub-virtue, upholding justice (nusrah), was added and defined as undergoing personal risks and sacrifices to uphold social justice and struggle against the oppression and wrongdoings of others (al-Ghazālī, 2001, IV, 386–392). This item also includes aspects of excellence in partnership (husn al-sharika), but it also adds the notion of upholding justice in the face of wrongdoings and standing up for what is right. While this may resemble courage, this sub-virtue was conceived as being situated within social contexts and in relation to others. The sub-virtue of truthfulness (sidq) was also added and defined as “being able to remain honest and trustworthy in one’s social dealings.” This was inspired by the prophetic narrations emphasizing the gravity of lying in Islam:

The Messenger of Allah (peace & blessings be upon him) was asked, “Can the believer be a coward?” He said, “Yes.” He was asked, “Can the believer be a miser?” He said, “Yes.” He was asked, “Can the believer be a liar?” He said, “No.” (Al-Mundhirī, 2003, part 4)

Moved sub-virtues: Religious vigilance (wara’) was moved from temperance, where al-Ījī had placed it, to the new TIV category of spirituality. Religious vigilance is described as a continuous consciousness of the presence of Allah and believing that none of their behaviors nor inner thoughts can be concealed from Him. This leads one to be meticulously engaged in continuous acts of righteous and abstinence from the prohibited (Taşköprizade, 2014, pg. 87). Reliance on Allah (tawakkul), contentment (riḍā) with Allah’s decree, and worship (ʿibada) were all moved to this category. Reliance on Allah (tawakkul) is described as “having complete trust in Allah. And to exert all the means available to them in hopes of achieving a positive outcome while realizing that the ultimate outcome comes from Allah alone” (al-Qushayrī, 1966, I, p. 464–487; al-Ghazālī, 2001, IV, p. 243–247, 259–293; al-Suhrawardī, 1993, p. 238). Contentment (Riḍā) with Allah’s decree is defined as “a complete satisfaction with the decree of Allah, believing that whatever He has willed for His slave is best for him” (al-Qushayrī, 1966, p. 421–423, 425, 426; al-Ghazālī, 2001, IV, p. 333–345; Ibn al-Qayyim, 1983, II, p. 178–251). Worship (ʿibadah) is defined as “a demonstration of servitude and submission to Allah through religious rituals and good deeds” (al-Ghazālī, 2001, I, 116; IV, 301, 361; al-Suhrawardī, 1993. p. 541; Ibn al-Qayyim, 1983, I, 90–167). Al-Ījī’s sub-virtue of submission (taslīm) was combined with the sub-virtue of worship.

Added sub-virtues: The sub-virtue of contemplation (tafakkur) was inspired by following Qur’anic verse:

It was defined in the TIV as “the reflection upon the creation of the heavens and the earth leading to seeing the greater purpose of life that motivates an individual to live in a more meaningful way.” Imam al-Ghazālī also has a section in his Revival of the Religious Sciences devoted to the importance and methods of contemplation. Given Islam’s emphasis on contemplative exercises, this item was added under spirituality (Badri, 2000).

The Traditional Islamic Virtues (TIV) model is the first modern classification of virtues that draws inherently upon the Islamic character literature in its conceptualization and philosophical underpinnings. It catalogues the most known virtues in the Islamic tradition, outlining a criterion by which to evaluate oneself. While many Muslims are maybe culturally aware of the presence of such virtues, a classification and culmination of these virtues may not be readily accessible in the modern literature. Furthermore, by compiling and classifying this list of virtues, it allows for numerous follow-up studies and potential interventions to be conducted. The most immediate need is to create an inventory for the TIV model that can serve as a questionnaire and assessment tool to measure the virtues in both clinical, educational, and communal settings. The TIV model can also be turned into community and education settings, focused on creating awareness about character virtues and social interventions for increasing the virtues. A concerted focus on the creation of programming and research on the TIV can help create social, educational, and clinical interventions that can help improve the lives and psychological well-being of Muslim communities globally.