Article

How to Think about the Basic Moral Status of Manipulation

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Abstract

This is an accepted article with a DOI pre-assigned that is not yet published.

Drawing on the broader theoretical framework that I developed in The Concept and Ethics of Manipulation, this paper examines the question of the basic moral status of manipulation, challenging the prevailing assumption that manipulation is inherently morally problematic. I first argue that we may conclude that manipulation is not pro tanto wrong by showing that no relevant wrong-making feature—such as deception, exploitation, or disrespect for autonomy—is necessarily present in all cases of manipulation. I then address a stronger claim: that manipulation may be inherently morally bad even if not strictly wrong. Against this view, I illustrate the central role of manipulation in the good human life, especially emphasizing its function as a “social lubricant” that enables cooperation, alleviates psychological barriers, and facilitates interpersonal understanding in contexts where rational persuasion is ineffective or counterproductive. I argue that once we appreciate how pervasively manipulation is integral to and indispensable for the human good, it becomes implausible to view it as pro tanto bad. I conclude with a note on “metaethical humanism”: the indispensability of philosophical anthropology for determining moral valence.

Keywords: Manipulation, wrongness, badness, metaethical humanism