0. Introduction
Unlike those drawing on misogynist ideology to punish women for âstepping out of lineââfor aspiring beyond their place, as it wereâthe hostile enforcer of gender conformity relies on the ideology of gender binarism to insist that the gender non-conforming person is entitled to no space, no place, no existential entitlement. There is no place for the gender non-conforming person to retreat and exist as such. Retreatâconformity to the gender binaryâentails annihilation, non-existence. (Watson 2020, 240)
Lori Watson is here describing what she calls âmisandrogyny.â1 This paper gives an account of misandrogyny as a system of mechanisms and centers attention on misandrogynyâs targets, not its perpetrators or their psychologies. In these ways, the account is modeled after Kate Manneâs account of misogyny in Down Girl.
Manneâs account centers attention on its targets rather than its perpetrators, and it characterizes misogyny as systemic rather than psychological. Rather than suppose that misogyny requires its perpetrator(s) to loathe women, Manne proposes that misogyny is the ââlaw enforcementâ branch of a patriarchal order, which has the overall function of policing and enforcing its overall ideologyâ (Manne 2019, 63). The ideology that misogyny enforces is constituted by patriarchal norms and expectations that call women to give feminine-coded goods to men: â[B]y the lights of patriarchal ideology, a woman is often expected to play the role of a manâs attentive, loving subordinateâ (ibid., 57). Feminine-coded goods include sex, attention, care, epistemic deference, and sympathy. When women donât provide these goods, the mechanisms of misogyny put them back in their patriarchal place with hostility, threats, and violence (ibid., 47). Misogyny targets women because they are women in a manâs world (not in a manâs mind), and it maintains the patriarchal gender hierarchy by keeping women in their subordinate place in a manâs world.
On the account of misandrogyny developed here, it is likewise a law enforcement branch of a patriarchal2 order, not a psychological disposition. Where misogyny enforces the patriarchal gender hierarchy, misandrogyny is a system of mechanisms that together police and enforce the gender binary of a patriarchal order. The gender binary is constituted by norms that preclude the existence of persons who arenât consistently âreadâ either as a man (and only a man) or as a woman (and only a woman). Misandrogyny thus polices and enforces exactly the nonexistence of people who are neither women (only) nor men (only). Iâll use âgender non-conforming folksâ or âGNC folksâ to refer to these targets of misandrogyny. (Iâll elaborate on the term below.) Whereas misogyny targets women because they ought to be subordinate according to dominant gender structures, misandrogyny targets GNC folks because they ought not to exist according to dominant gender structures.3 Whereas misogyny pushes women down into their subordinate place, misandrogyny pushes GNC folks out of existenceâeither by pushing its targets out of literal or social existence or by pushing them into binary gender positions.
Giving this account of misandrogyny reveals the unity in a number of processes that target GNC folks, thereby pointing to the workings of a system that polices and enforces the gender binary. Misandrogyny, like misogyny, is best understood as a system that targets people who are distinctively positioned in a gendered system. Rather than focus on the psychological motivations of those who perpetrate it, itâs better to uncover the systems that victimize GNC people, that cultivate psychological dispositions that encourage targeting GNC folk for violence, and that erase GNC folks from view.
In the remainder of this section, I develop a few preliminary points that put the analysis in context and address some questions. Sections 1â3 describe three kinds of misandrogynistic mechanisms. I divide the mechanisms according to the different ways that they push GNC folk into nonexistence. Mechanisms of assignment push individual GNC folk into one patriarchal gender role or the otherâtypically (but not always) the role associated with their sex assigned at birth. Mechanisms of assimilation make it so that GNC folk canât access basic necessities or other goods unless we cease to be GNC and assimilate into the gender binary. These mechanisms push GNC folk into some place, any place in the gender binary.4 Mechanisms of annihilation aim to bring it about that GNC folk are nonexistent. They push GNC folk out of literal, social, legal, institutional, or epistemic existence. In describing mechanisms of annihilation in section 3, I focus on mechanisms that target GNC folk for literal, physical death. It would take separate papers to fully develop the ideas of social, legal, institutional, and epistemic nonexistence, and I wonât attempt it here.
0.1 Preliminaries
Who are GNC folk?
I use âGNC folkâ to refer to misandrogynyâs targets. A person is GNC in this sense just in case they are not consistently situated among patriarchal norms as either a man (only) or a woman (only). Loosely, âGNC folkâ refers to everyone who isnât either a man or a woman according to patriarchal norms. Patriarchal norms not only call for women to give feminine-coded goods to men; they also determine whether one is (situated at a time and place as) a woman, a man, both, neither, etc. In making sense of this, it can help to think that there are two âlevelsâ of patriarchal norms. The norms that Manne describes, the norms that demand feminine-coded goods from women, are at a âhigherâ level. The âlower-levelâ patriarchal norms determine how people are situated in that hierarchy (if theyâre situated in it at all).5 For example, the lower-level norms in the contemporary United States make it so that (with a lot of qualifications and caveats) a skinny White person with shoulder-length hair is more likely to be read as a woman. These lower-level norms determine which parts of human bodies matter to determining gender in which contexts,6 which behaviors are to be read as relevant to gender and how, which clothes and accessories, which jobs, which kinds of friendship, etc. etc. ad nauseam (cf. Ăsta 2011; Butler 1990; 1993). Some people are situated among these norms such that they are consistently taken to be gender-conforming women. Others are situated such that they are consistently taken to be gender-conforming men. âGNC folkâ refers to everyone else.
There are three important points to keep in mind about how Iâm using âGNC folkâ here.
First, note that my characterization is based on how persons are situated among patriarchal normsâit is not based on self-identification, chromosomes, or genitalia. For instance, if Ze identifies as genderqueer, then thereâs a case to be made that Ze is genderqueer; but if Ze is consistently situated among patriarchal norms as a man, then Ze is not in the extension of âGNC folkâ as Iâm characterizing it here. Similarly, if Chitra identifies as a cis woman, but she isnât consistently situated as a woman among patriarchal norms, and she isnât consistently situated as a man among patriarchal norms, then Chitra is GNC as Iâm defining it here. Thus, âGNC folkâ as I characterize its extensionincludes many people who do not and would not identify as gender non-conforming, and it excludes some people who would identify as non-binary, agender, genderqueer, gender non-conforming, etc. It includes many (but not all) cis people, many (but not all) transpeople, and many (but not all) people who identify as non-binary, GNC, genderqueer, etc.
Thatâs because my aim in the paper is to articulate a system that enforces patriarchal norms. What makes one a target of that enforcement is how one is situated among patriarchal norms. Similarly, Manneâs account of misogyny is about how people are situated in hierarchical patriarchal norms and how theyâre targeted by patriarchyâs mechanisms of enforcement. On the analogous view offered here, misandrogyny is about how people are situated in patriarchyâs gender binary norms and how theyâre targeted by its mechanisms of enforcement. Self-identification, chromosomes, and genitalia may affect how one is situated among patriarchal norms, of course, and when they do, they will affect whether one is GNC or not. So self-identification, chromosomes, genitalia, gender presentation, etc. can affect whether one is GNC or not on the characterization given here. But they matter only insofar as they affect oneâs positioning among patriarchal norms.
Second, keep in mind that oneâs positioning among patriarchal norms is influenced by various ideologies, stereotypes, myths, and cultural tropes. As Robin Zheng (among others) has pointed out, races are often âgendered,â so that âAsians as a racialized group are stereotyped as feminine,â and âBlacks as a racialized group . . . are stereotyped as masculineâ (Zheng 2016, 405â6). Such stereotypes plausibly contribute to how one is gender-positioned in various institutions: Angela Davis suggests that conceptions of femininity centering Whiteness led to Black and Indigenous American women being incarcerated in menâs prisons in the nineteenth century (Davis 2003, 72). Similarly, insofar as gender conceptions in the West often center wealthy, young, non-disabled, White, straight, cis people, they make it so that class, age, ability status, race, sexual orientation, and gender identity, among other things, affect how one is positioned among patriarchal gender norms. Patriarchal norms interact with norms of classism, White supremacy, ableism, ageism, heterosexism, and others to determine whether or not one is GNC.
Third, I said above that misandrogyny targets anyone who isnât consistently read as either a woman only or a man only. Thatâs a convenient shorthand, but âreadâ has stronger psychological connotations than is appropriate here. Being read as neither a man (only) nor a woman (only) will often correlate with being a target of misandrogyny, but the basis for being a target of misandrogyny is how one is situated among patriarchal norms, not how one is read (although of course the two are strongly correlated).
Are there GNC-coded goods?
There seems to be an obvious disanalogy between misogyny on Manneâs account and misandrogyny as Iâve described it. Misogyny targets women in order to police and enforce patriarchal norms that call for women to give feminine-coded goods to men. Misandrogyny, Iâve said, targets GNC folk in order to police and enforce norms that constitute the gender binary. The most straightforward way to push this analogy would be to say that there are GNC-coded goods and patriarchal norms that call for GNC folk to give these goods to men (or perhaps men and women). But are there any GNC-coded goods? If patriarchal norms give no place to GNC folk, isnât it dubious that they also mark some goods as GNC-coded? Rather, there should be no such marking under patriarchy.
For the reasons just suggested, Iâm going to proceed as though there are no gender non-conforming-coded goods under patriarchy. (Which isnât to say that there are no GNC-coded goods! Just that patriarchy doesnât recognize any.) But I think the question is worth taking seriously. Although itâs useful to describe the âlogicâ of oppressive systems when weâre articulating them, there are good reasons to think that they can be self-contradictory. Women, for instance, are expected to be both sexually available and chaste. It is not out of the question that GNC folk may be normatively positioned as both nonexistent and givers of some goods. It is worth considering, for instance, whether settler-colonial White supremacy situates Indigenous American non-binary gender systems and the non-binary persons in those systems as having some distinctively GNC-coded goods in some cases.
That said, the account of misandrogyny given here doesnât require that there be GNC-coded goods under patriarchy. The analogy turns on the enforcement of patriarchal norms. Where misogyny enforces the norms of the gender hierarchy, misandrogyny enforces the norms of the gender binary. Where misogyny polices and enforces womenâs role in the gender hierarchy, misandrogyny polices and enforces the nonexistence of GNC folks in the gender binary. Misogyny pushes women down into subordinate gender roles; misandrogyny pushes GNC folk out of existence.
If there arenât GNC-coded goods, what are gender binary norms like?
In my view, there are three broad kinds of patriarchal norms that get enforced by three kinds of misandrogynistic mechanisms. I sketch them here and return to them in the sections below. The relevant norms are unified in that they call us to expect and endorse the nonexistence of GNC folk. They do this in different ways. In some cases, they call us to conform to our assigned birth genders and to expect that others will do the same. In other cases, norms of the same kind call us to conform to one binary gender or another, if not to oneâs birth assignment. Remove bodily hair to be a woman; donât remove it to be a man. Grow long hair to be a woman; donât to be a man. Build upper body musculature to be a man; diet to be a woman. And so on. These norms call us to rid ourselves of features that would make us gender non-conforming, whether the gender we conform to âmatchesâ oneâs sex assigned at birth or not, and they call us to expect that others will likewise render their gender non-conformity nonexistent. I call these ânorms of assignment.â
In addition, patriarchal norms call us to endorse and expect that every person is either a man or a woman, no one is both, and no one is neither. These norms are evident in how readily we accept, for instance, gender binary bathroom options. In taking it that itâs acceptable (under patriarchal norms) for a school or public space to have gender binary bathroom options, itâs accepted that everyone is either a man or a woman and no one is neither. In accepting that there wonât be any men in womenâs rooms and there wonât be any women in menâs rooms, itâs accepted that no one is both a woman and a man. The same considerations apply, mutatis mutandis, for gender segregated prisons, schools, dormitories, sports, and shelters, and for gender-markings on government identification, gender-marked school uniforms, and gender-marked professional dress. These all evidence what I call ânorms of assimilation.â
In some of the more jarring cases, patriarchal norms call us to endorse and expect that GNC folk have no place in society. These expectations are plausibly entangled with the two kinds of norms noted above. Expecting that everyone will eradicate features that donât conform to one of the two binary genders can have a hint of the expectation that if we donât eradicate those features, then there will be no place for us: we will be socially unwanted, undeserving of attention and care, without standing in economic, educational, political, and social spaces. And accepting that gender binary bathrooms accommodate all persons can give us the impression that not only is there no place for GNC folk in society but thatâs how it ought to beâthere ought to be no place for GNC folk. Similar expectations show up in how normal it feels to many people that GNC folk are marginalized economically, legally, socially, and institutionally. Iâm not convinced that there are distinctive patriarchal norms that underwrite these expectations; they may be grounded in the kinds of norms noted above. But there are distinctive mechanisms that aim to bring it about that GNC folk have no place in society; I call them âmechanisms of annihilation.â
Is this analysis intersectional?
Some commentators have criticized Manneâs account of misogyny on grounds that it fails to be intersectional. For instance, Nora Berenstain charges that while Manne âmakes roomâ for insights about intersecting oppressions and includes examples involving women who are not rich, White, hetero, cis, or otherwise privileged, thatâs not enough. An intersectional analysis should also âtheorize misogyny and other forms of oppression as structurally interdependent,â and discussion of examples should include substantive analyses of the roles that other forms of oppression play (Berenstain 2019, 1367). Insofar as the present analysis is modeled on Manneâs, it is reasonable to ask whether the account given here also fails to be intersectional.7
This section gives reasons to think that the analysis in this paper is intersectional. Iâll point to influential accounts of what makes an analysis intersectional and to parts of the present paper that exhibit the relevant intersectional-making features.
KimberlĂŠ Crenshaw is most often credited with coining the term âintersectionality.â Crenshaw makes the case that analyses of oppression in terms of just one âaxisâ or issueâracial oppression, sayâtend to focus attention on the most privileged members of an oppressed group (e.g., class-privileged Black men, class-privileged cis White women) and obscure (or at least leave unanalyzed) the mechanisms that target the most vulnerable (e.g., poor Black women). (See, e.g., Crenshaw 1989, 151â152.) In order to avoid theorizing that further entrenches privilege and obscures vulnerability, we should offer analyses that acknowledge multiple axes of oppression and focus on those who are disadvantaged by multiple axesâthose who are situated at the intersections of multiple axes of oppression. Thus, I focus on those who are situated at the intersections of multiple axes of oppression. For each mechanism of misandrogyny described below, I provide examples illustrating the mechanism working in concert with other axes of oppression.
But as Berenstain points out, itâs not enough merely to give examples that focus on persons disadvantaged by multiple axes of oppression; we should also provide substantive analyses of those other forms of oppression. Each section below includes substantive (but of course brief) discussions of forms of oppression that intersect with misandrogyny. In discussing mechanisms of assignment, for instance, I appeal to Angela Davisâs analysis of how womenâs prisons reinforce gender, race, and class hierarchies. The section on mechanisms of assimilation engages with analyses of the war on terror and colonialism. Section 3 discusses mechanisms of annihilation in conjunction with analyses of transphobia, White ignorance, and settler colonialism.
One reason that intersectional analyses include substantive discussion of various forms of oppression is that, as Berenstain says, they âtheorize misogyny and other forms of oppression as structurally interdependent.â Patricia Hill Collins says intersectional analyses draw on the insight that race, class, gender, sexuality, etc. operate as âreciprocally constructing phenomenaâ (Collins 2015, 2). Similarly, Vivian May says intersectionality approaches âsystems of oppression as enmeshed and mutually reinforcingâ (May 2015, 3). Accordingly, this paper presents misandrogyny as interdependent and mutually reinforcing with patriarchy, White supremacy, colonialism, heterosexism, imperialism, and other systems of oppression. In section 2, for instance, I make the case that mechanisms of assimilation are mutually reinforcing with colonialism, White supremacy, and the targeting of undocumented immigrants. Each section discusses interdependencies between specific mechanisms of misandrogyny and various other forms of oppression.
Ange-Marie Hancock proposes that, among other things, intersectional analyses identify four âplaying fieldsâ upon which race, gender, class, etc. interact: âthe hegemonic (ideas, cultures, and ideologies), structural (social institutions), disciplinary (bureaucratic hierarchies and administrative practices), and interpersonal (routinized interactions among individuals)â (Hancock 2007, 74). This paper identifies intersections in each of these playing fields: we saw above that various ideologies interact in determining the extension of âGNC folk.â Weâll see below that misandrogyny interacts with White supremacy, colonialism, and sexism on the structural playing field, with White supremacy and the war on terror on the disciplinary playing field, and with racialized social power, White conceptions of queerness, transphobia, homophobia, and racism in interpersonal interactions.
It would be fruitful to identify more interactions on the various playing fields Hancock mentions, and perhaps it would help to consider other accounts of intersectionality, but I hope this suffices for this relatively short piece.
Misandrogyny and transphobia
Many GNC folk who are targets of misandrogyny are trans. According to a common misconception, every trans person has a binary gender: they have had medical interventions to transition away from one to âthe otherâ binary gender. But this conception conflicts with one of the more influential definitions of âtransgenderâ in trans studies, namely, that given by Susan Stryker: âany and all kinds of variation from gender norms and expectationsâ (Stryker 2008, 19). (The common misconception, of course, illustrates the invisibility of GNC folk.) If we take âgender norms and expectationsâ in this definition to refer to patriarchal norms and expectations, then it would seem that everyone who is GNC is also transgender and vice versa.8 This overlap suggests a question: Why say that what Iâm describing here is misandrogyny rather than transphobia?
Scholarly and popular usage most often take âtransphobiaâ to refer to psychological biases and negative attitudes that target transpeople. Take, for instance, Talia Mae Bettcherâs use: âI use the term transphobia not necessarily to imply the fear of transpeople, but simply any negative attitudes (hatred, loathing, rage, or moral indignation) harbored toward transpeople on the basis of our enactments of genderâ (Bettcher 2007, 46). As Bettcher notes, such attitudes likely âlie at the root of much violence against transpeopleâ (ibid.). This, I take it, gives us reason to maintain a use of âtransphobiaâ that refers to negative psychological attitudes.
This does not imply (and I donât take Bettcher to be saying) that there arenât systems of mechanismsâin addition to individual psychological attitudesâthat target transpeople for violence. There are. In my view, these mechanisms overlap considerably with the mechanisms of misandrogyny. Mechanisms of misandrogyny target anyone who doesnât conform to the gender binary, i.e., GNC folk. Many transpeople are GNC folk and vice versa. Accordingly, the mechanisms I describe here overlap considerably with mechanisms that target trans folk. But rather than repurpose the term âtransphobiaâ to refer to these mechanisms, it is preferable to retain the term that refers to negative psychological attitudes toward transpeople. Itâs important to have a term with that referent. Moreover, Lori Watson has introduced the term âmisandrogynyâ for the purpose of referring to mechanisms that target gender-non-conforming people. Since the term âtransphobiaâ is already in use for a different important purpose, and since âmisandrogynyâ is already used to refer to mechanisms that target GNC folk, I use misandrogyny for that same purpose here, and I refrain from repurposing âtransphobia.â
In addition, as a dominant binary trans narrative has emerged, it may be that patriarchal norms that situate binary transpeople qua trans have emerged as well, and these may be accompanied by distinctive mechanisms of enforcement. An adequate account of transphobia as a system of mechanisms should determine whether these possibilities are actual at present. Thatâs not my aim here. Consequently, the account here would plausibly be inadequate as an account of systems of transphobia, and I discourage readers from thinking of it as one.
So much for preliminaries. In the following sections, Iâve divided the mechanisms that enforce misandrogyny into three kinds. I suspect there are more, though, and I wouldnât be surprised if there are better ways to classify the mechanisms. I propose the following as a point of departure.
1. Assignment
Norms of assignment call us to rid ourselves of features that would make us gender non-conforming and to expect that others will do the same. Mechanisms of assignment enforce these norms. They enforce the placelessness of GNC folk by assigning each of us to a specific position in the gender binary.
Weâre subject to mechanisms of assignment at least from birth. In many hospitals in the United States and Europe, patriarchal gender norms dictate that a newbornâs gender is fully determined by their genitalia and hormonesâthese are the only features available to situate a newborn among patriarchal gender norms. Consequently, patriarchal norms donât distinguish between a person who is intersex and one who is gender non-conforming at this stage of life; intersex newborns are often situated as gender non-conforming, and as such, they are subject to mechanisms of misandrogyny. Their bodies are made to conform to the gender binary through sex assignment, surgeries, and hormone treatments.
As Anne Fausto-Sterling (among others) has described, it is shockingly common for practitioners to perform medical interventions on intersex newborns, altering their bodies so that they conform to the gender binary. Upon the birth of a child whose genitalia are âeither/or, neither/both,â as Fausto-Sterling puts it, âthe attending physician . . . consults a pediatric endocrinologist and a surgeon, and they declare a state of medical emergencyâ (Fausto-Sterling 2000, 45). They tell the parents that they can and will âidentify the âtrueâ sex that lies underneath the surface conditionâ (ibid., 50). Once they do, theyâll use hormonal and surgical treatments to alter the childâs body to conform to the gender assignment. As research shows and as intersex activists point out, such medical interventions are plausible violations of patient agency and likely contribute to later psychological distress (Ferrara and Casper 2018, 3). In addition, in order to maintain the presumed ânaturalnessâ of the binary gender position to which a child has been assigned, many parents and physicians donât tell the child about the medical interventions theyâve undergone. Monica Casper reports that when she was the executive director of the Intersex Society of North America (ISNA), âshe was told repeatedly by activists that learning they were lied to by their parents and physicians was âfar worseâ than any physical alteration to their bodies, although these too were seen as damagingâ (ibid., 3).
Throughout life, one is routinely punished for gender non-conformity in ways that push one into a gender assignment. These punishments range from everyday gender policing to violent attacks. Everyday gender policing includes bullying, taunts, nudges, and corrections whenever one steps out of gender conformity. In these cases, one is often read as a failed or unruly man or woman (cf. Watson 2020, 240). Bullying and taunts target one for being a failure; nudges and corrections aim to help one overcome oneâs gender failures. Bullying and taunts for gender non-conformity are likely familiar from most readersâ personal experiencesâas recipients, witnesses, and/or bullies. Itâs little surprise that gender non-conforming children and adults are more likely to be targeted for bullying, harassment, and name-calling than gender-conforming peers (Clarke 2019, 910).
Nudges and corrections often come from parents, teachers, coaches, and friends. Children who wear the âwrongâ clothes, play with the wrong toys, play the wrong sports, play too aggressively or too passively, speak in the wrong ways, walk in the wrong ways, etc. etc. are often thereby situated among patriarchal norms as gender non-conforming. They are then subject to mechanisms of assignment that push them back into a gender assignment by disapproving looks or remarks; by having toys, activities, or clothes hidden or taken away, by pressure to join gender-conforming activities, sports, friend groups, and so on. Meanwhile, teens and adults, especially those read as AFAB (assigned female at birth), might receive humiliating nudges or corrections that push them toward their perceived gender assignment: advice on makeup, clothes, hair styles, social passivity, etc. or for those read as AMAB (assigned male at birth), exhortations to be more aggressive, dominant, muscular, etc.
Adult conversation often involves subtle mechanisms of assignment. Z Nicolazzo describes cases in which Black non-binary trans students are pushed into binary gender assignments by subtle dismissals from predominantly White queer student groups. These dismissals tend to characterize the Black non-binary students as not âtrans enough,â leveraging racialized social power to police what is and isnât âtrans enough,â and illustrating the dominant conception of queerness as White queerness (Nicolazzo 2016, 8â10; Logie and Rwigema 2014; cf. Clarke 2019, 911). One case focuses on Silvia, a Black non-binary trans college student who identifies as agender and multiply disabled, and who uses âshe/her/hersâ pronouns. Silvia is talking to a binary trans man in the mostly White student group TransActions, which focuses on trans issues and gender activism. As Silvia describes a date sheâs been on, the other student says, âThis conversation really proves that Iâm not a womanâ (Nicolazzo 2016, 10). The implication is that Silvia is a woman, and the differences between the speaker and Silvia revealed in the story suffice to establish that the speaker is not a woman.9 But Silvia isnât a woman either. Sheâs agender. Nonetheless, when she tried to describe aspects of her life to a predominantly White trans group, she was subtly pushed to interpret her experiences as those of a cis woman. Prima facie, binary gender norms and racial norms that position queerness as White conspired to preclude the possibility of Silviaâs being Black, trans, and non-binary. When she tried, she was assigned to cis womanhood by her White peersâ subtle dismissalsâdismissals deriving their power partly from mutually reinforcing mechanisms of misandrogyny, White supremacy, and ableism.
Because these mechanisms push us into being either a man (and not a woman) or a woman (and not a man), they often differ in how they push us: the ways they push one to be a man differ from the ways they push one to be a woman. This is manifest when mechanisms of assignment are violent. Katherine A. Rimes and colleagues (2019) compared victimization experiences of non-binary and binary trans youth according to sex assigned at birth. They found that AFAB study participants, both binary and non-binary, were more likely than non-binary and binary AMAB (assigned male at birth) participants to experience sexual abuse. Rape and sexual abuse push one into a womanâs patriarchal position by extracting feminine-coded goods. They âmakeâ their targets women by forcing a âfailed womanâ or a âdisobedient womanâ into the patriarchal feminine sexual role (Rimes et al. 2019, 237). Meanwhile, when mechanisms of assignment violently push one into a manâs role, they often aim to provoke one into enacting patriarchal masculinity. They try to goad the target into violence, dominating others, or sexual abuse of women. This may explain why Rimes and colleagues found that AMAB study participants, both binary and non-binary, were more likely than non-binary and binary AFAB participants to experience physical assault (ibid., 237).
Much work on early womenâs prisons reveals both (i) how they enforced the gender binary and (ii) how misandrogyny can be mutually reinforcing with misogyny, White supremacy, and class domination. Angela Davis characterizes AFAB convicts in a way that resembles Lori Watsonâs remark that presumed AFAB GNC folk are seen as âfailed womenâ: âAccording to dominant views [during the nineteenth century], women convicts were irrevocably fallen women. . . . [F]emale criminals were seen as having transgressed fundamental moral principles of womanhoodâ (2003, 70). Prison reformers didnât challenge the idea that women convicts were fallen women but that they were beyond redemption. As a path to redemption, reformers proposed prisons that would push criminalized AFAB persons to assimilate to White, middle-class domestic roles. Reporting on a prison described by Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, Davis says their regimes were âbased on the assumption that âcriminalâ women could be rehabilitated by assimilating correct womanly behaviorsâthat is, by becoming experts in domesticityâespecially cooking, cleaning, and sewingâ (ibid., 63). As Joanne Belknap put it, â[A]n important role of the reform movement in womenâs prisons was to encourage and ingrain âappropriateâ gender roles, such as vocational training in cooking, sewing and cleaningâ (1996, 95; cited in Davis 2003, 71). As institutionalized mechanisms of assignment, such regimes pushed AFAB persons into binary feminine gender roles.
In addition, by pushing âfallen womenâ into training that emphasized domestic labor, womenâs prisons reinforced gender, race, and class hierarchies. They prepared more affluent women for domestic lives of financial dependence on husbands, and they âsteered poor women (and especially Black women) into âfree worldâ jobs in domestic serviceâ (Davis 2003, 70). Moreover, since Black and Indigenous American women were often segregated from incarcerated White women, sentenced to menâs prisons, or exposed to the convict lease system, these âfeminizedâ womenâs prisons reflected and reinforced conceptions of femininity that center Whiteness (ibid., 72).
Although mechanisms of assignment often push GNC folk into their assumed birth assignment, they donât always enforce conformity with oneâs birth assignment; they enforce conformity to the binary, whether one is pushed to conform to oneâs birth assignment or to the so-called opposite gender. Dean Spade describes how medical institutions enforce and stabilize the gender binary by making conformity to binary gender norms and dominant binary trans narratives prerequisite for access to gender-affirming surgeries or hormones. âThe âsuccessfulâ daily performance of normative gender is a requirement for receiving authorization for body alterationâ (Spade 2006, 319). In some cases, one is expected to âlive in the new gender role . . . for 1 to 2 years in order to experience life in the new role and develop appropriate role behaviorsâ (Shore 1984, 277). In most cases, one must acquire letters from two mental health experts and document persistent gender dysphoria.10 Take these points in the context of surgeries that affirm the genders of cis women or men: breast augmentation, plastic surgery, hair implants, and so on. As Spade points out, one doesnât need letters from two psychiatrists or to live âas a small-nosed womanâ for years before being granted access to rhinoplasty (Spade 2006, 315). There are no restrictions on medical interventions that contribute to gender conformity, and they are often covered by medical insurance (Spade 2011, 148â149). But similar interventions are denied unless or until itâs proved that they wonât contribute to gender non-conformity. In these cases, mechanisms of assignment punish GNC folk and push us into gender conformity by inhibiting access to medical services and making gender conformity a necessary precondition for treatment.
2. Assimilation
Mechanisms of assimilation push GNC folk into the gender binary by making basic necessities and goods available only to persons who assimilate to some binary gender. Whereas mechanisms of assignment push us into some assigned place in the gender binaryâusually the gender associated with oneâs presumed birth assignmentâmechanisms of assimilation push us to be somewhere, anywhere in the gender binary. Mechanisms of assignment enforce the placelessness of GNC folk by assigning individual people into binary gender roles; mechanisms of assimilation enforce the same by pushing GNC folk to assimilate into physical, institutional, legal, and social spaces that allow only for binary gender roles. Mechanisms of assignment push triangular (oval, rectangular, trapezoidal, etc.) blocks into round holes or square holes. Mechanisms of assimilation produce lids (for buckets of blocks) that have only round and square holes.
Readers are likely aware that the organization of physical, institutional, legal, and social space is such that there is often no place for GNC folk qua GNC. Gender segregated bathrooms, schools, dormitories, sports, prisons, shelters, and recovery centers are common. They organize physical, institutional, legal, and social space in ways that make appropriate places for people who are men (and not women) and appropriate places for people who are women (and not men). If you are both or neither, then patriarchal gender segregation organizes the world such that there is no place for you. If you want to use the bathroom, live in a dormitory, play a sport, or access a shelter for homelessness, addiction, or to escape abuse, then you will often have to assimilate into the gender binary; this means you must stop being both/neither, conceal your gender non-conformity, or let others overlook it. If you are incarcerated or sent to a gender segregated school, shelter, or care facility, you will be presumed to be (only) a man or (only) a woman. Gender segregated spaces serve to enforce the nonexistence of GNC folk and push us into the gender binary.
More and less official gender binary markers also push us to assimilate. Government identifications and applications for jobs, schools, scholarships, etc. often require one to choose a binary gender. (At present, seventeen countries, eighteen US states, and the District of Columbia allow non-binary gender designations on at least some official documents.) Many schools that arenât gender segregated have gender-marking uniforms. If Ze is neither a boy nor a girl or both a boy and a girl, then there is no appropriate uniform for Ze to wear. It is currently legal for employers to prescribe sex-differentiated dress codes (Clarke 2019, 978), and, in any case, âprofessional attireâ is often relative to the wearerâs presumed binary gender. If one is neither/both, then one is less likely to be read as âprofessionalâ during interviews or other formal interactions for jobs, schools, scholarships, court hearings, etc. Gender-coded identification, dress, and customs exclude GNC folk and reinforce our placelessness.
Things have improved in some casesâsome universities, airports, shopping malls, restaurants, etc. have all gender or single-occupancy bathrooms, for instance, and there are ongoing attempts to recognize non-binary genders on US passports.11 But the fact remains that patriarchal gender binary norms call for accommodations that exclude GNC folk. Where they do, mechanisms of assimilation make it so that there is no place for us unless we assimilate to some binary gender. As Lori Watson puts it, we must âadopt a gender or fail to have a social existenceâ (Watson 2020, 240). Assimilating to the gender binary is necessary not only for accessing resources but for having a social existence at all. If you fail to satisfy binary gender norms, you wonât have a social identity, and you wonât be recognized as intelligibly human (cf. ibid.). Mechanisms of assimilation structure the world so that social standing, respect, recognition, and moral worth are distributed in ways that exclude GNC folk.12
When mechanisms of assimilation push GNC folk into the gender binary, they sometimes push a single individual into different binary positions in different cases; when they do, they are especially punitive, and they often reinforce (and are reinforced by) other mechanisms of oppression. Dean Spade gives an example.
[F]or example, one person born in New York and living in New York might have a birth certificate she cannot change from âMâ to âFâ because she has not had genital surgery; a driverâs license that correctly reflects âFâ because she got a doctorâs letter; Social Security records that say âMâ because she cannot produce evidence of surgery; a name change order that shows her new feminine name; and a Medicaid card that reads âFâ because the agency had no official policy and the clerk felt the name change order and driverâs license were sufficient. (Spade 2011, 145)
Whether this person identifies as binary or non-binary, she is situated among patriarchal norms as gender non-conforming, and thus she is a target for mechanisms of assimilation. Moreover, the ways that she has been assimilated in different cases combine to make for another violation of patriarchal gender norms. Binary gender norms preclude the possibility of persons who are âMâ in some cases and âFâ in others, and yet this is what her records show. Consequently, those who consult her records in the light of patriarchal gender norms may target her for further exclusion, marginalization, or violence. This includes employers who do background checks or who require documentation that confirms information on oneâs job application; it includes police, officials checking documents for travel, and bureaucrats involved in processing applications for other official documents. As Spade points out, in the context of the war on terror, when such discrepancies show up in the gender records of persons already subject to increased surveillanceâthanks to their race or immigration statusâit can make them a target for interrogation, detention, and violence (Spade 2011, 146). Similarly, in the case of Black, Brown, and Indigenous persons already targeted for incarceration and violence by state systems, discrepancies in oneâs gender records offer an occasion for incarceration and state violence.
The dangers of âinconsistentâ records have increased as the United States has increasingly targeted undocumented immigrants. In efforts to identify undocumented immigrants, US government agencies that collect identifying data now regularly compare their data looking for âmismatchedâ information on individuals. (Previously, data had been shared only during specific investigations.) When they find it, they might threaten to revoke the individualâs driverâs license, pressure their employer to rectify the âdiscrepancy,â etc. (Spade 2011, 151). These new policies expose immigrants and anyone whose gender records âconflictâ to harassment and exploitation by employers, violence from police or ICE, and loss of access to government services and benefits. Here, misandrogyny facilitates surveillance of undocumented immigrants while the targeting of undocumented immigrants for harassment, exploitation, and violence exposes GNC folk to the same.
Mechanisms of assimilation have played significant roles in colonialism. Colonial efforts to assimilate Indigenous peoples, for instance, often included enforcing binary gender norms on communities that had recognized non-binary genders for generations (see, e.g., Morgensen 2010, 111â116). Moreover, Indigenous violations of binary gender norms were often taken as justification for forced assimilation. Mark Rifkin shows how âpolicies aimed at assimilating Indians . . . figured Indian cultures as other than heteronormative in order to reinvent and assimilate them as straight, private property-owning, married citizens.â13 Andrea Smith has argued that sexual violence and âthe imposition of European gender relationships on Native communitiesâ even enabled European colonization of Native peoples (Smith 2005, 139). Ifi Amadiume describes how, prior to colonialism, the gender system of the Nnobi society in southeastern Nigeria allowed for what Amadiume calls âmale daughtersâ and âfemale husbands.â But under colonialism, the institutional and social structures supporting these gender positions were condemned, abandoned, and reinterpreted in order to assimilate the culture to the patriarchal gender binary (Amadiume 1987, 123). In these cases and others, mechanisms of assignment, assimilation, and annihilation work in concert to serve the purposes of colonialism. Cultures that recognize more than two genders or that allow more gender non-conformity were forced to reorganize themselves to fit the patriarchal gender binary. Individuals who were non-binary were subject to mechanisms of assignmentââgendered and sexual reeducationâ (Morgensen 2010, 114). Individuals and communities who didnât assimilate were subject to mechanisms of annihilation (ibid., 111â117; Smith 2005, 178). The mechanisms of misandrogyny in these cases conjoined with racist, religious, and Eurocentric ideologies to enact and justify genocide and exploitation. Meanwhile, the need to legitimize colonial genocide and exploitation plausibly helped reinforce binary gender norms and mechanisms of misandrogyny.14
3. Annihilation
Mechanisms of annihilation aim to bring it about that GNC folk are nonexistent. They push GNC folk out of literal, social, legal, institutional, or epistemic existence. If mechanisms of assignment push triangular (oval, rectangular, trapezoidal, etc.) blocks into square and round holes and mechanisms of assimilation produce systems that have only round and square holes, then mechanisms of annihilation discard, discount, and destroy blocks that arenât round or square.
Readers are probably already aware that fatal violence against trans and gender non-conforming people is rampant. According to numbers compiled by Transrespect Versus Transphobia Worldwide, at least 350 trans and gender non-conforming people were murdered from the beginning of October 2019 to the end of September 2020; disproportionately many were Black women or women of color, sex workers, migrants, and/or poor. Although many of us mourn these murders annually on Trans Day of Remembrance, patriarchal norms that call for the nonexistence of GNC folk often position them as justifiedâitâs supposed to be that we donât exist. In recounting the 2008 murder of Latisha King, Gayle Salamon makes the case that âin many instances of violence against gender-nonconforming people and transpeople . . . violence justifies itself by characterizing non-normative gender as itself a violent act of aggression and reading the expression of gender identity as itself a sexual actâ (Salamon 2018, 5). The defense in the Latisha King murder trial pursued a âgay panicâ defense, in which a man presumed to be straight claims that he was thrown into a panic by a gay manâs sexual advances and thereby led to allegedly justified violence. Salamon attended the trial and reports that the defense team offered âno evidence of explicitly sexual aggression on Larryâs [Latishaâs] part,â but that instead, âno sexual provocation was required because Larryâs feminine gender was already a panic inducing provocationâ (ibid. 5, emphasis in original). According to the logic of a gay panic defense, a man seeks to exculpate himself from violence by appealing to the revulsion and rage of being the object of a gay sexual advance. On these lawyersâ extension of that defense, an AMAB personâs mere expression of a feminine gender is similarly threatening and similarly an excuse for violence. Their case, in short, was that Latishaâs mere gender non-conformity justified her being the target of violence. The violence justifies itself, as Salamon says. Talia Mae Bettcher describes much the same in the murder of Gwen Araujo and her murderersâ appeal to a âtrans panic defenseâ (Bettcher 2007, 44).
The case of Latisha King illustrates one intersection of mechanisms of annihilation and mechanisms of White supremacy. Latisha King was biracial and identified as Black; in one pretrial hearing, a gang expert testified that her murderer, Brandon McInerney, was affiliated with a White supremacist group (Salamon 2018, 39â40). One would expect these facts to inform public understanding of the murder and subsequent trial. But media reporting and the trial focused on Kingâs gender non-conformity (ibid., 25â37). The press seemed to ignore the relevance of White supremacist violence to the murder. On the one hand, the focus on Kingâs gender non-conformityârather than on her murdererâs White supremacyâbolsters Salamonâs claim that according to patriarchal norms, Kingâs own gender expression was the cause and justification of the murder. On the other hand, the refusal to acknowledge the role that White supremacy might have played in the murder is plausibly a consequence of what Charles Mills calls âWhite ignorance,â wherein epistemic norms warped by a White supremacist political system call knowers to ignore the causes and consequences of racial oppression (see Mills 1997; 2007; see also Medina 2012 35)
Mechanisms of annihilation are also manifest in medical neglect, abortion of intersex fetuses, and genocide. In August 1995, Tyra Hunter was in a car accident that left her badly injured; when EMTs arrived and uncovered her genitalia, they stopped treating her for 5â7 crucial minutes while they made transphobic jokes and used racist and sexist slurs. When she arrived at the hospital, some doctors refused to treat her and some assumed she was HIV+. She died about an hour after arriving at the ER.
As noted above, intersex newborns are often positioned as GNC folk at birth and targeted by mechanisms of assignment. Intersex fetuses, meanwhile, are often targeted by mechanisms of annihilation. Kwon Chan Jeon and colleagues report on the regularity with which intersex fetuses are targeted for termination (Jeon et al. 2012).
As noted in the previous section, mechanisms of annihilation are often mutually reinforcing with colonial oppression. Scott Lauria Morgensen points out that â[c]olonists interpreted diverse practices of gender and sexuality as signs of a general primitivity among Native peoples. Over time, they . . . framed Native peoples as queer populations marked for deathâ (Morgensen 2010, 106, emphasis added). He reports, for instance, that when European-descended explorers encountered non-binary Indigenous peoples in North America, their response was less often to single out the non-binary individuals for violence and more often to subject their communities to âmilitary attack, containment, or removalâ (ibid., 113). In conjunction with settler colonialism and racism, mechanisms of annihilation targeted entire communities for nonexistence.
In addition to taking away the physical lives of GNC folk, mechanisms of annihilation also target us for social, legal, institutional, and epistemic nonexistence. One would like a precise definition for each of these âkinds of nonexistence,â but I wonât provide any here. Nonetheless, I take the general idea to be relatively straightforward: when mechanisms of annihilation arenât literally destroying GNC folk, they serve to marginalize us to such a degree that we have no social, legal, institutional, or epistemic standing. As Lori Watson says:
Gender non-conforming persons . . . are perceived as occupying a space of contradiction: human and not intelligibly human. Their bodies and self-presentation do not fit within the schema of intelligible humanity. Normative notions of humanity carry with them the gender binary. One is never simply a human. They are a kind of human, a man, a woman, a member of a racial group, and so on. (Watson 2020, 240)
When weâre situated among patriarchal norms as ânot intelligibly human,â we donât have social, legal, institutional, or epistemic standing. The mechanisms that enforce those norms see to it.
4. Conclusion
Misandrogyny is a system of mechanisms thatâtogether with other systems of oppressionâenforces the norms that constitute the patriarchal gender binary. According to those norms, everyone is either only a man or only a woman; GNC folk donât exist. Misandrogyny enforces this nonexistence by (i) assigning GNC folk to a binary gender and punishing non-conformity to that gender, (ii) assimilating GNC folk and cultures into the binary gender system, and (iii) eliminating GNC folk and cultures. Although much has been written on gender policing, binary gender norms, transphobia, and other topics related to misandrogyny, we also need to appreciate that misandrogyny is a system of mechanisms that punishes those who violate binary gender norms. Future work should elaborate further on how misandrogyny intersects with other systems of oppression, including misogyny, transphobia, White supremacy, ableism, classism, and settler colonialism; and it should spell out how mechanisms of annihilation bring about social, legal, institutional, and epistemic nonexistence.
Notes
- Watson acknowledges that the term is suboptimal in that it suggests that all gender non-conforming persons are committed to androgyny. The term, however, captures âthe hostility, both interpersonal and structural, that gender non-conforming persons faceâ (Watson 2020, 237). I follow Watson in using the term for these reasons while rejecting âthe implication that gender non-conformity entails androgynyâ (ibid., 237). âŽ
- I intend to follow Manneâs use of âpatriarchyâ and its cognates, according to which it refers, broadly, to a system of gender-based dominance that divides persons into binary genders (men and women) and privileges men. âŽ
- Thanks to a referee for this journal for suggesting the latter clause in this sentence. âŽ
- These mechanisms do not necessarily push one to conform to the gender assigned at birth. They structure the world in ways that make various necessities and resources unavailable unless one assimilates to the gender binary. Section 2 clarifies this point further. âŽ
- This level of norms is âlowerâ in the sense that it is prerequisite to the higher level norms. The lower level sorts us into the gender binary, and then the higher level establishes a hierarchical ordering of the two sorts. Thanks to a referee for this journal for pushing me to clarify the higher/lower metaphor here. âŽ
- For example: hair, chest, and shoulders in many contexts but perhaps not at elite weight-lifting events; musculature in the hands but not the feet; hair on faces, arms, legs, and chests, etc. âŽ
- Iâm grateful to a referee for this journal for pressing me on this point. âŽ
- Keep in mind, however, that there may be cases in which a person identifies as trans but is consistently situated among patriarchal norms as a woman only or a man only; in this case, I take it that the person is trans by virtue of their self-identity, but they are not GNC on my definition because they are not positioned among patriarchal gender norms and expectations as neither a man only nor a woman only. âŽ
- If it helps, you can think of Silviaâs conversation in terms of Mary Kate McGowanâs conversational exercitives. Silviaâs peer makes a conversational move that is âfair playâ only if Silvia is a woman. If no one objects, then it is subsequently permissible in the conversation to take it that Silvia is a woman (McGowan 2009). âŽ
- One is often also required to rehearse a dominant narrative according to which one identified with âthe opposite genderâ from a young age. As Spade points out, this both (i) reinforces the invisibility of non-binary transpeople and (ii) makes it seem as though only people who have identified with âthe opposite genderâ from a young age experience gender dysphoria in a way worth taking seriously. Consequently, when any person P experiences discomfort with their assigned gender role (as most people do), the dominant narrative tells us to ask whether P identified with âthe opposite genderâ from a young age or not. If so, then P is binary trans. If not, then P is not trans at all and should âremainâ in their assigned binary gender role. âŽ
- See H.R. 5962 for federal legislation that would allow a non-binary gender identification. âŽ
- Thanks to a referee for this journal for suggesting that I expand on this point in this way. âŽ
- Schneider 2007, 606â607, referring to Rifkin 2006. Cited in Morgensen 2010, 108. âŽ
- Thanks to a referee for this journal for pointing this out. âŽ
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