Colonial Injustice and Self-Respect

1. Introduction

Colonialism has historically involved racism, dehumanization, rape, torture, exploitation, slavery, and genocide. Such evils render colonialism, as we know it, deplorable.

Colonialism is necessarily pro tanto wrong.¹ But why? In §2, I argue colonialism unfairly diminishes colonized peoples’ social bases of self-respect. But just states secure their subjects’ social bases. These social bases constitute a social primary good (Rawls 1971, 396). Therefore, colonized individuals are wronged by colonial institutions, which the colonial regime contributes to a colonized people’s basic structure of society. So, colonial institutions are unjust. I reply to objections in §3. Then, in §§4–6, I compare my account with three existing competitors: Stilz’s (2019) autonomy view, Ypi’s (2013) associative view, and Ferguson and Veneziani’s (2021) acquisition view.² Finally, in §7, I outline the implications for future work on just war theory, self-determination, and social oppression.

I should state my assumptions concerning the wrong of colonialism and what colonialism is. Conceivably, no significant pro tanto wrong is present in all instances of colonialism.³ However, a unified account is preferable for two reasons.

First, explanatory simplicity is a theoretical good. Of course, simplicity is only one theoretical good among many. We should nonetheless explore the prospects for a unified theory. Even if no unified explanation can succeed, we will best appreciate this impossibility result after evaluating various candidate explanations.

Second, while colonialism comes in many forms, something unifies them: the political subjugation of one people by another. I will argue that this unity in what colonialism is generates a unity in its wrongfulness.

Colonialism necessarily involves political subjugation. People A politically subjugates people B iff both (i) A’s political body controls a significant portion of B’s basic structure of society and (ii) this portion of B’s basic structure treats many of B’s members as moral inferiors.

(i) is an intuitive condition on political subjugation. A people’s basic structure consists of major sociopolitical institutions, which impose rules on the people’s individual members. Assuming “the primary subject of justice is the basic structure” (Rawls 1971, 7), (i) is necessary for political subjugation. By controlling much of a people’s basic structure, subjugators significantly diminish the people’s ability to secure domestic justice. Because justice is a political subject, such control instantiates a political species of subjugation.

But why include condition (ii)? Consider a case:

rescue: Due to unforeseeable and catastrophic natural disasters, Unlucky’s political institutions have collapsed. Important politicians are dead. Important buildings are in shambles. Unlucky risks entering a state of nature. Unlucky cannot, in the foreseeable future, (re)establish just institutions without external aid. Friend, a neighboring state, decides to temporarily rule over Unlucky’s territories with the intention of rebuilding Unlucky’s political institutions so it can rule its territories again. Friend organizes fair democratic elections within Unlucky’s territories to replace Unlucky’s lost politicians. Friend rebuilds Unlucky’s political institutions and returns jurisdictional authority to Unlucky immediately once it is capable of effective self-rule—say, in five months. Friend does not exploit Unlucky; if Friend receives any payment from Unlucky, it amounts merely to fair compensation.

rescue is not colonialism.⁴ If political subjugation is necessary for colonialism, rescue’s being non-colonial indicates that (i) does not suffice for colonialism. Suppose (ii) is necessary for political subjugation and thus colonialism. Then rescue instantiates neither. Friend’s control over Unlucky’s basic structure does not treat Unlucky’s subjects as inferior. In rescue, Friend’s justification is that Unlucky’s subjects need rescue from political disaster. This justification does not presuppose that Unlucky’s subjects are morally inferior. Consider an analogy. Suppose Ann rescues Bill from serious harm. Ann need not treat Bill as inferior. Bill has no complaint against rescue. So, (ii) is a necessary condition on political subjugation. Henceforth, I assume colonialism requires (ii) and political subjugation.⁵

Colonialism is typically characterized as a form of “alien domination” (Lu 2011, 262) involving the political “subjugation of one people to another” (Ypi 2013, 162). It is, however, outside the scope of this paper to further analyze the alien political subjugation that characterizes colonialism.⁶ I require merely that political subjugation constitutes one necessary condition on colonialism.

Nonetheless, it will be useful to consider four paradigm forms of colonialism: settler colonialism, economic colonialism, paternalistic colonialism, and justice-seeking colonialism. These four categories are neither mutually exclusive nor collectively exhaustive. I introduce them to test my positive proposal. It must predict that these forms of colonialism are pro tanto wrong.

First, settler colonialism involves colonizers’ settling on colonized peoples’ territories. Settler colonialism involves political subjugation because it requires control over territorial components of colonized peoples’ basic structures. In settler colonialism, the colonizing regime controls a colonized people’s territory and the conditions under which the colonized use it. Second, economic colonialism involves the exploitation of colonized peoples’ labor, markets, or natural resources. Economic colonialism involves political subjugation because it requires control over economic institutions in colonized peoples’ basic structures. Third, paternalistic colonialism involves a paternalistic attempt to promote colonized individuals’ good. Paternalistic colonialism involves political subjugation because it uses institutional means. For example, paternalistic colonizers might impose laws requiring colonized individuals to convert to some religion (that, for the sake of argument, we may stipulate to be true). Finally, justice-seeking colonialism aims to promote justice for the colonized. Justice-seeking colonialism involves political subjugation because it aims to secure justice by institutional means. For example, justice-seeking colonizers might impose just laws. Justice-seeking colonialism is broadly paternalistic. However, I distinguish paternalistic and justice-seeking colonialism because, as I will argue in §2, they express different negative judgments about the colonized. What unites these colonial kinds, and colonialism more generally, is political subjugation: degrading control over colonized peoples’ basic structures.

Paradigm cases of settler colonialism include European and American expansion into modern US territories.⁷ A paradigm case of economic colonialism is French rule in Vietnam, which involved forced labor on rubber plantations under inhumane working conditions to generate profits for the French (Ngô 1989, 9–11). Historical cases of clearly paternalistic or justice-seeking colonialism are either rare or nonexistent. Colonizers often claimed, disingenuously, that colonial rule exists to benefit the colonized. Nonetheless, even paternalistic and justice-seeking colonialism would be objectionable. Since colonialism “could have unfolded differently with less devastating consequences for its victims” (Táíwò 2010, 16), a robustly anti-colonial view must explain why even paternalistic and justice-seeking colonialism wrong the colonized.

One motivation for seeking such a unified account is to persuasively answer colonialism’s contemporary proponents, such as Gilley (2018).⁸ These theorists believe colonial institutions could unobjectionably pursue what Gilley calls “the civilizing mission without scare quotes” (Gilley 2018, 168). Such colonialism would be paternalistic or justice-seeking (or both).⁹ One virtue of a unified account, such as the self-respect account I defend, is that it can persuasively answer this colonialist optimism. Given his position, Gilley (2018) could reasonably doubt colonialism must be pro tanto wrong if—as Valentini (2015, 330–331) and Moore (2019, 89–90) suggest—no wrong-making feature is essential to it. If what makes colonialism wrong (when it is) is contingent, why assume it must be necessarily pro tanto wrong in the first place?¹⁰ It would be viciously circular to merely stipulate that colonialism is necessarily pro tanto wrong. That would rule out Gilley’s position by stipulation. But if Gilley’s colonialist optimism fails, that is because it suffers from substantive philosophical problems.

Indeed, Gilley’s (2018) view is false because it fails to recognize that colonized peoples’ social bases of self-respect would be diminished even under paternalistic and justice-seeking colonial rule. My arguments stand on dialectically firm ground. They rest on substantive premises concerning (1) political subjugation’s being necessary to colonialism and (2) the social bases’ constituting a social primary good.¹¹ These commitments jointly unveil a substantive philosophical mistake underlying Gilley’s colonialist optimism. Crucially, he cannot reply that my commitments are objectionably circular or stipulative. Therefore, my self-respect account provides one persuasive rebuttal to Gilley (2018) and other contemporary colonialists.

2. The Self-Respect Account

Colonialism is necessarily pro tanto wrong because it undermines colonized peoples’ social bases for self-respect. I adopt Rawls’s claim that self-respect consists of two elements:

The first element is our self-confidence as a fully cooperating member of society rooted in the development and exercise of the two moral powers…The second element is our secure sense of our own value rooted in the conviction that we can carry out a worthwhile plan of life. (Rawls 1996, 318)

The first element requires the development and exercise of the two moral powers for a conception of the good and for a sense of justice. The moral power for a conception of the good is the ability to form, revise, and pursue one’s conception of the good. For Rawls, the sense of justice is the ability to understand and abide by a political conception of justice publicly determining fair terms of social cooperation in well-ordered societies (Rawls 1996, 19). However, I depart from Rawls slightly here. I understand this moral power to be the ability to understand and comply with reasonably fair terms of social cooperation.¹² The second element involves a sense of self-worth: a belief that one’s conception of the good is worth pursuing. One is free and equal in virtue of having the two moral powers to a sufficient degree (Rawls 1996, 19).

Self-respect is valuable because “without it nothing may seem worth doing, or if some things have value for us, we lack the will to strive for them. All desire and activity becomes empty and vain, and we sink into apathy and cynicism” (Rawls 1971, 440). Consequently, “self-respect…is the most important [social] primary good” (Rawls 1971, 396).¹³

Strictly speaking, however, the social bases of self-respect, not self-respect itself, constitute a social primary good. The social bases are the properties of a basic structure’s institutions that support individuals’ self-respect. If these social bases are a social primary good, then securing them is a matter of justice. Primary goods, however, “are necessary conditions for realizing the moral powers” (Rawls 1996, 307). Since the two moral powers are baked into the notion of self-respect, their social bases constitute a social primary good. A just society is a system of fair social cooperation. Such cooperation, however, is possible only between free and equal citizens possessing the two moral powers (Rawls 1996, 19–20).

Since the state can only guarantee its social bases, not self-respect itself, only the former constitutes a social primary good. A division of moral labor arises. The state’s task is to secure subjects’ social bases. If the state accomplishes this goal, it becomes individuals’ responsibility to develop their self-respect. This division of moral labor is justified because it is fair. Requiring the state to directly distribute self-respect among individuals—even if it were feasible—would unfairly burden many individuals. For some individuals, guaranteeing their self-respect would require excessive resources. These individuals might not develop self-respect even if provided their fair social bases.¹⁴ We might say, in analogy to expensive tastes (Dworkin 1981), that these individuals have “expensive self-respect.” The state need only guarantee individuals a fair opportunity to develop self-respect.

It is outside this paper’s scope to develop a theory of the social bases’ requirements. But to concretize the notion, I will mention five constraints. First, institutions must be non-oppressive. Oppressive institutions treat the oppressed as if their moral powers are less developed or less valuable than those of the privileged. Second, basic human rights must be protected. A state committing genocide or repressing political dissent cannot secure the social bases. Third, these social bases require democratic rights. Otherwise, only some individuals will have an equal say in political decision-making. Institutions upholding such political inequality treat some individuals’ conceptions of the (public) good as inferior in value to others’ (Krishnamurthy 2013, 186). Fourth, a basic structure must be public; its institutions’ constitutive rules must be accessible to subjects. Free and equal citizens cannot be reasonably expected to obey the law if they cannot discern its content. Furthermore, free and equal citizens cannot accept a nominal democracy in which sham elections are run and, unbeknownst to citizens, oligarchs make political decisions. Individuals are not treated as free and equal by opaque basic structures. Fifth, a basic structure must guarantee some minimal baseline of material resources. Most, perhaps all, conceptions of the good require some income or wealth. Satisfying these five constraints is necessary, but insufficient, to secure the social bases. The most general commitment I make is this: a basic structure secures all its subjects’ social bases only if it does not unfairly treat any of them as moral inferiors.¹⁵

But what is it to treat someone as morally inferior? It is to treat that person as if they lack at least one of the two moral power. Institutions can treat an individual as lacking a moral power in two ways. First, an institution can obstruct this individual’s development or exercise of a moral power. Suppose a state bans non-Christian modes of religious worship, which treats non-Christians as morally inferior. Their reasonable exercise of the moral power for a conception of the good is obstructed. Second, an institution can justify its constitutive rules on the grounds that an individual lacks a moral power. Suppose that, to discourage smoking, a state uses institutional means to exaggerate smoking’s harmful effects. The motivation for misinforming the public presupposes they are incapable of acting rationally given accurate information. This policy treats individuals as if they lacked the moral power for a conception of the good. In summary, a basic structure treats its subjects as morally inferior by either (I) obstructing their development or exercise of a moral power, or by (II) imposing rules presupposing they lack a moral power.

Colonialism diminishes colonized individuals’ social bases of self-respect by treating them as inferior. By subjugating a people, colonizers treat them as their moral inferiors. This result follows from political subjugation’s definition, which I stated in §1. But this institutional degradation unjustly diminishes colonized individuals’ social bases. Colonial institutions constitute a significant part of a colonized people’s basic structure.¹⁶ If these institutions treat the colonized as inferiors, then some of the most powerful sociopolitical influences on their lives form a public reminder of their supposed inferiority. Unsurprisingly, then, anticolonial activists often “choose institutional disorder…to destroy the institutions built by the colonizer” (Memmi 1957/2003, 182). Colonial institutions wrong the colonized.

I have developed the self-respect account of colonialism’s necessary pro tanto wrong. To defend it further, I will apply it to four paradigm cases: settler, economic, paternalistic, and justice-seeking colonialism.

Historically, settler colonialism devastated colonized peoples’ social bases of self-respect. In settler colonialism, the colonized are eliminated—by genocide, forced displacement, or cultural assimilation—to facilitate colonizers’ territorial expansion (Wolfe 2006). Colonial genocide treats the colonized as inferior by unjustly eliminating the murdered persons’ ability to pursue any conceptions of the good. Moreover, it treats the colonized as if they have no moral worth: they are treated as expendable for the purpose of territorial expansion. Even among survivors, genocide makes their ability to pursue a conception of the good too dependent on colonizers’ whim and zeal. Furthermore, settler colonial displacement obstructs colonized individuals’ location-based plans of life. Where one lives, works, and participates in events of cultural significance matters: “individuals’ central life projects are often bound up with specific geographic locations, so that interference with their use and possession of these places undermines the lives people have built” (Stilz 2019, 11). Finally, colonial cultural assimilation involves not only an institutional degradation of colonized peoples’ traditional cultures, but also coerced assimilation.¹⁷ Consequently, the attendant colonial institutions obstruct colonized individuals’ moral power for a conception of the good. They are denied a fair opportunity to pursue traditional cultural practices.

The Carlisle Indian Industrial School exemplified American settler colonialism’s assimilative wing. Its founder declared “all the Indian there is in the race should be dead. Kill the Indian in him, and save the man” (Pratt 1892, 46). This justification for an education system degrades those it (mis-)educates. Sun Elk, a Taos Pueblo student at Carlisle, recounts his experience thusly:

They told us that Indian ways were bad. They said we must get ‘civilized’…It means ‘be like the white man’…And the books told how bad the Indians had been to the white men—burning their towns and killing their women and children…We all wore white man’s clothes and ate white man’s food and went to white man’s churches and spoke white man’s talk. And so after a while we also began to say Indians were bad. We laughed at our own people. (Nabokov 1999, 222)

Sun Elk’s testimony illustrates how cultural assimilation can diminish colonized individuals’ self-respect. Boarding schools taught Native American students to internalize a belief that they were inferior to colonizers. Not only did this mis-education diminish their sense of self-worth, but it also unjustly obstructed their moral power for a conception of the good. These schools taught Native Americans to glorify Christian, Anglo-American ways of life and to deplore traditional, indigenous ones. Settler colonial institutions are multifarious. But they always diminish colonized peoples’ social bases.

Economic colonialism treats the colonized as inferior by obstructing their moral power for a conception of the good. In economic colonialism, colonial institutions exploit the colonized for colonizers’ economic benefit. These institutions disrespect colonized peoples’ moral power for a conception of the good in two related ways: not only do they (re)produce poverty among the colonized, but they also treat their conceptions of the good as subordinate to colonialist interests. Economic colonialism is exploitative. Over time, it impoverishes many colonized individuals. But poverty threatens one’s moral power for a conception of the good. Moreover, in virtue of its self-justification, economic colonialism presupposes colonized individuals’ conceptions of the good are significantly inferior in value to colonizers’. What motivates economic colonialism, after all, is the prospect of exploitation-driven profit. Effectively, “what the colonist was saying to the colonized subject was: ‘work yourself to death, but let me get rich!’” (Fanon 1961/2004, 135)

French rule over Vietnam provides a paradigm example. While the precolonial Nguyễn imperial court may be criticized on various grounds, it alleviated gross inequalities, provided natural disaster relief, and supplied land to most peasants (Ngô 1991, 38; Nguyen-Marshall 2008, 29). In contrast, by the 1930s, most Vietnamese peasants were landless under French rule. In South Vietnam, “about 75 percent of the peasant population was landless, and…nearly 80 percent of all landowners owned almost nothing” (Ngô 1989, 9). Generally, landless peasants either tilled land under exploitative conditions or worked in even worse conditions on French plantations and mines. In these plantations and mines, Vietnamese laborers worked about 17 hours a day and earned only about 50 piastres (French Indochina’s currency) a year. This salary was a pittance; “a dog belonging to a [French] colonial household cost 150 piasters a year to feed” (Ngô 1989, 10). Furthermore, due to inhumane working conditions, Vietnamese laborers’ mortality rate at colonial rubber plantations was roughly 30%. Among Vietnamese peasants, French colonial plantations and mines became known as ‘hells on earth’, ‘slaughterhouses’, and ‘death valleys’ (Ngô 1989, 11). The Vietnamese were “crushed by the [so-called] blessings of French protection. The [Vietnamese] peasants especially are…crushed by this protection: as [Vietnamese] they are oppressed; as peasants they are robbed, plundered, expropriated, and ruined” (Hồ 1967, 36). French colonialism impoverished Vietnam. It exploitatively treated the Vietnamese as subhuman creatures who were inferior in worth to French colonizers. This historical example illustrates how economic colonialism undermines colonized peoples’ social bases.

Paternalistic colonialism diminishes colonized peoples’ social bases by treating them as if they lacked the moral power for a conception of the good.¹⁸ The colonized are treated as if they need colonial rule to pursue valuable conceptions of the good.

While proponents of colonial rule often claimed that it advanced colonized individuals’ good, paternalism was never its primary justification. So, consider a hypothetical case. Suppose Canada annexes Montana to impose laws that Canadian politicians (correctly) believe will advance Montanans’ interests. Perhaps these laws compel Montanans to practice a true religion and to stop smoking. Such paternalistic laws, however, express a negative judgment of Montanans’ capacity to choose a valuable plan of life. Such laws’ justification must be that Montanans cannot independently pursue valuable conceptions of the good. Relatedly, Canada’s annexation of Montana is paternalistically motivated by the belief that Montanans need alien rule to rationally pursue valuable conceptions of the good.

But what about the fourth kind of colonialism, justice-seeking colonialism? Under justice-seeking colonialism, colonial institutions aim to promote justice for the colonized. Colonialists typically consider justice-seeking colonialism a justified form of humanitarian intervention. But even if such cases of colonial humanitarian intervention existed, they would instantiate a weighty pro tanto wrong. In these cases, this wrong would be outweighed by the good of overall justice for the colonized.

In justice-seeking colonialism, colonial institutions treat the colonized as though they lack the moral power for a sense of justice. The justification underlying justice-seeking colonialism is that the colonized cannot secure justice without colonial subjugation. For example, consider Mill’s claim that “barbarous” peoples cannot engage in fair reciprocity and may therefore be subjugated by “civilized” peoples:

To suppose that the…same rules of international morality can obtain between one civilized nation and another, and between civilized nations and barbarians is a grave error…The rules of ordinary international morality imply reciprocity. But barbarians will not reciprocate. They cannot be depended on. Their minds are not capable of so great an effort, nor their will sufficiently under the influence of distant motives. In the next place, nations which are still barbarous have not got beyond the period during which it is likely to be for their benefit that they should be conquered and held in subjection by foreigners. (Mill 1859/2006, 259)

For Mill, colonially subjugating “barbarous” peoples is justified if it improves their capacity for fair social cooperation, or reciprocity. But this justification of colonialism patently presupposes that the colonized are “savages” who lack the moral power for a sense of justice. Colonial institutions justified on these grounds diminish colonized peoples’ social bases of self-respect.

This Millian apologia has been historically influential.¹⁹ For example, many have decried the colonial “campaign to convince us [Africans] that we cannot govern ourselves, that we are unworthy of genuine independence, and that foreign tutelage is the only remedy for our wild, warlike and primitive ways” (Nkrumah 1969, 17–18).

The Millian justification for justice-seeking colonialism is infantilizing. This justification implies the colonized should, like children, be treated as if they cannot follow just terms of social cooperation. This shared logic of infantilization suggests that paternalistic and justice-seeking colonialism share a key feature. Both treat the colonized like children who need external direction. Colonialists often see a colonial regime as “a mother who…prevents her basically perverse child from committing suicide [i.e., acting irrationally] or giving free rein to its malevolent instincts [i.e., acting unreasonably]. The colonial mother is protecting the child from itself” (Fanon 1961/2004, 149).²⁰

Both forms of colonialism treat the colonized as inferior but differ in how they do so. Paternalistic colonialism treats the colonized as irrational, lacking the moral power for a conception of the good. Justice-seeking colonialism treats the colonized as unreasonable, lacking the moral power for a sense of justice.

I have argued that settler, economic, paternalistic, and justice-seeking colonialism diminish colonized peoples’ social bases of self-respect. I emphasize, however, that my self-respect account does not rest on an argument by cases. As previously mentioned, the unity in what colonialism is produces a unity in its wrongfulness. Colonialism involves political subjugation. So, the colonized are unfairly treated as moral inferiors. Consequently, colonial institutions diminish colonized individuals’ social bases. That is unjust. Therefore, colonial institutions wrong the colonized.

3. Objections

I reply to three objections.

4. Stilz’s Autonomy View

For Stilz, colonialism is necessarily pro tanto wrong because it necessarily violates colonized individuals’ political autonomy. Colonialism subjects them to political institutions that do not reflect their “judgments as to how, and by whom, they should be governed” (Stilz 2019, 107). Consequently, colonial institutions are alienating. But alienation precludes political autonomy. Political autonomy’s value “lies in mitigating [the] threat of alien state coercion” (Stilz 2019, 107). A politically autonomous individual maintains her “sense of oneself as an agent who charts her life in accordance with her own purposes” (Stilz 2019, 107). Political institutions reflect politically autonomous agents’ shared will—a joint intention—to cooperate politically. Call this will a ‘shared political will’.

Some citizens fail to participate in a shared political will. Some may be anarchists. Others may be bigoted. Stilz accommodates this observation by requiring states to respect only the political will shared by a significant majority of cooperators, who—roughly—are reasonable individuals (Stilz 2019, 110). Anarchists and bigots are not cooperators.

Finally, “subjects’ shared political will [must be] freely formed in a manner that is accountable to their own deliberative processes” (Stilz 2019, 109). This constraint forbids states from manipulating their subjects into sharing a political will.

We now arrive at Stilz (2019, 111) account of political autonomy:

Stilz’s Account of Political Autonomy An individual is politically autonomous iff both (a) the institutions governing that individual reflects the shared political will of a significant majority of its subject cooperators, and (b) this shared political will is freely formed under conditions conducive to deliberative reasoning.

Legitimate authority requires political autonomy (Stilz 2019, 104). If its subjects lack political autonomy, a state is (partially) illegitimate. But it is pro tanto wrong for such a state to rule.

For Stilz, colonialism conflicts with colonized individuals’ political autonomy. Usually, (a) is false of colonized cooperators. They normally share a political will to be governed by non-colonial institutions.

However, Stilz’s (2019) account undergenerates. Political autonomy is not the core value that colonialism threatens. Recall that political autonomy matters because, with it, an individual can “maintain [a] sense of oneself as an agent who charts her life in accordance with her own purposes” (Stilz 2019, 107). This interest partially constitutes an interest in developing a moral power for a conception of the good, and thus self-respect. Assuming Stilz’s claims about political autonomy’s value, its institutional preconditions become a social basis of self-respect. But these conditions cannot exhaust the social bases. Intuitively, the social bases of self-respect support freedom and equality. And colonial institutions can be objectionably inegalitarian without undermining political autonomy.²⁵ So, Stilz’s approach fails to explain why colonialism is necessarily pro tanto wrong.²⁶

Consider an example. Suppose that, under conditions conducive to deliberative reasoning, the Worshipper people’s members share a political will to become the Exploiter people’s colonial subject. Perhaps the Worshippers are devout and believe the Exploiters are their god’s chosen people. Consequently, Worshippers reason that they have a divine imperative to serve Exploiters. Aware of these facts, the selfish Exploiters subjugate Worshippers and exploitatively restructure their economic institutions. Even upon reflection, Worshippers freely consider their servitude’s religious value to trump exploitation’s costs. Moreover, Worshippers still recognize each other as moral equals and achieve minimal justice domestically. So, some Worshipper cooperators exist. These cooperators share a political will to be Exploiters’ colony. Worshippers satisfy Stilz’s conditions for political autonomy. Intuitively, however, they are colonized. They are wronged by Exploiter rule.²⁷ So, Stilz’s view undergenerates colonial wrongdoing.

In contrast, my self-respect approach accommodates this example. Exploitative colonial institutions unfairly obstruct Worshippers’ moral power for a conception of the good. Therefore, Worshippers’ social bases of self-respect are diminished. That implies they suffer from injustice.

5. Ypi’s Associative View

Ypi claims “the wrong of colonialism consists in the creation and upholding of a political association that denies its members equal and reciprocal terms of cooperation” (Ypi 2013, 158). For Ypi, colonialism instantiates an objectionable hierarchy: colonizers deny equal and reciprocal terms of political association to the colonized.

Political associations should be equal and reciprocal, which introduces procedural and substantive norms (Ypi 2013, 178). First, the process by which the association’s terms are formed should respect the parties’ equality. For example, Brazilians would wrong uncontacted Amazonians by unilaterally imposing terms of political association on them.²⁸ Second, the association’s terms should be substantively fair. For example, Brazilians should not make exploitative trade deals with Amazonians, even if Amazonians consent to them. “Colonialism is wrong because it violates the ideal [of political association] in the first but often also in the second of these dimensions” (Ypi 2013, 178).

Ypi focuses on the first, procedural condition: “the consent of those on the receiving end is required…Colonizers impose their will over the colonized” (Ypi 2013, 179–180). Since the colonized fail to consent to colonial subjugation, colonial associations’ terms cannot be both reciprocal and equal. In Ypi’s view, this is colonialism’s necessary wrong.

However, this consent-based view undergenerates. Consensual colonialism is possible. Consider, once again, the Worshippers and Exploiters. The Worshippers consent to becoming Exploiters’ colony.²⁹ Nonetheless, Exploiters’ colonial institutions wrong Worshippers.³⁰

In reply, Ypi can appeal to substantive, content-based norms governing political associations. While she does not characterize the relevant substantive norms, she could retreat to the claim that the Exploiters’ colonial rule is objectionable because it violates some such norm(s). Indeed, there is some affinity between this account and my self-respect account. On both views, colonial institutions necessarily commit some substantive wrong.

This reply, however, faces a dilemma. Either the substantive wrong is instantiated by all inegalitarian political associations, or it is not.

Suppose it is. Then Ypi’s view overgenerates. Some inegalitarian associations are unobjectionable. Consider a hypothetical state of nature in which a territory’s inhabitants all consent to representative government by an elect few. There is no justification for their possessing political authority besides everyone’s consent to it. There is some political inequality between the elected politicians and everyone else. But this political association seems unobjectionable. It does not involve colonialism’s wrong. Emphasizing political associations’ substantive (in)equality and (non-)reciprocity predicts colonial wrongdoing in cases where there is no wrongdoing at all.

So, only some inegalitarian political associations instantiate colonialism’s substantive wrong. A proponent of Ypi’s view might object, however, that only some cases involve relevant inequalities. Intuitively, colonialism is an objectionably inegalitarian form of political association. So, perhaps a weaker version of Ypi’s view can identify colonialism’s wrong as that of imposing objectionably unequal or unreciprocal terms.

So, consider my dilemma’s other horn, on which only some inegalitarian political associations are morally objectionable. However, the variant of Ypi’s view under discussion fails to get to the heart of the matter. Consider the class of political associations involving substantively objectionable terms. Why are these associations substantively objectionable? This question must have an answer. But whatever this answer is, it will provide a more satisfying answer to our original question: the question of what makes colonialism necessarily pro tanto wrong. If Ypi’s associative account is developed further to analyze the relevant substantive equality and reciprocity in terms of something else (e.g., self-respect), then it is this something else that does the real, interesting work.

The self-respect account enjoys greater explanatory power. It explains why colonial associations must involve objectionable hierarchy: they unfairly diminish colonized peoples’ social bases of self-respect. This degrading treatment constitutes an injustice. While my self-respect account may be strictly compatible with the variant of Ypi’s view that emphasizes colonialism’s substantive wrongs, the self-respect account provides a deeper explanation.

6. Ferguson and Veneziani’s Acquisition View

Ferguson and Veneziani (2021) develop a Lockean account.³¹ They claim “colonialism was wrong…because it involved the violation of acquisition based territorial rights” (Ferguson and Veneziani 2021, 427), which the territory’s original proprietors acquired in Lockean fashion.³² In Lockean fashion, original proprietors acquired territorial rights. Ferguson and Veneziani remain neutral on whether these original proprietors are individuals or collectives (Ferguson and Veneziani 2021, 429). On the individualist interpretation, individuals acquired property rights over territory and then (explicitly or tacitly) consensually transferred their territorial rights to a state. On the collectivist interpretation, collectives (e.g., states) acquired territorial rights directly. Either way, territorial rights are special property rights. Consider these two interpretations in turn.

The collectivist interpretation denies reductive individualism, the thesis that fundamental bearers of moral rights and duties are individuals. On the collectivist view, sui generis collectives appropriated territories and gained territorial rights. But although it is popular, reductive individualism can be contested. So, it fails to provide a decisive objection to the collectivist view.

A more forceful objection: only just collectives have rights. So, the collectivist acquisition view cannot condemn the colonial subjugation of unjust peoples; this view implies they have no territorial rights. But even such colonial subjugation is wrongful. So, the collectivist acquisition view undergenerates.

Now consider the individualist interpretation, according to which the original individual appropriators were individuals who consensually transferred their territorial rights to a state. But “since no current state’s territorial claims have been legitimated through the agreement of original appropriators, [the acquisition account of territorial rights] implies that no current state has territorial rights” (Stilz 2019, 27).³³ This result is counterintuitive. But there is a bigger problem. Since no states would have territorial rights, acquisition theorists cannot predict that colonialism is ever pro tanto wrong. That is absurd.

So, both variants of the acquisition account undergenerate. They arguably also overgenerate. On both variants, all territorial rights infringements instantiate colonialism’s wrong. But the wrong identified is too thin. The theft of some natural resources violates a state’s territorial rights. But, even if extended over time, a series of small thefts constitutes a relatively minor wrong. Surely, any interesting wrong of colonialism must be worse than that.

Acquisition theorists might protest that the moral difference between minor thefts and colonialism is a matter of degree, not kind. But there is a principled reason why territorial rights violations need not constitute colonialism: these rights violations need not involve political subjugation. Imagine two states, each of which insignificantly violates the other’s territorial rights. One steals a gallon of gasoline from the other; this other state retaliates by stealing a dozen bricks from the first state. Neither political subjugation nor colonialism arises here. Political subjugation is essential not only to what colonialism is, but also to its weighty necessary wrong. The acquisition theorist cannot accommodate this intuition.³⁴

7. Conclusion

I conclude by highlighting three potential lines of future work. First, the self-respect account suggests that enforcing a people’s social bases of self-respect constitutes a (defeasible) just cause for war. This inference is tempting if wars of colonial liberation always have a just cause—at least when warfare is morally necessary to achieve decolonization. This just cause must have something to do with colonialism’s necessary pro tanto wrong. Assume decolonization constitutes a just cause for war. The self-respect account’s proponents might explain this fact by arguing that peoples have a just cause to wage war to enforce their members’ rights to enjoy the social bases.³⁵ If so, then the social bases can explain why decolonization is so valuable that it justifies killing, and dying, in its name. Although he states things more strongly than I would, the self-respect account suggests there is some truth to Fanon’s remarks that, for anticolonial revolutionaries, “violence is a cleansing force. It rids the colonized of their inferiority complex, of their passive and despairing attitude [if any]. It emboldens them, and restores their self-confidence” (Fanon 1961/2004, 51).

Neither Ypi’s (2013) nor Ferguson and Veneziani’s (2021) accounts can do analogous work. Neither coercion nor territorial rights violations are (always) sufficiently weighty to generate a just cause for war. In contrast, the social bases constitute the most important social primary good. As such, they are more likely to generate a just cause.

Second, the self-respect account illuminates political self-determination’s value. Infringing peoples’ rights to self-determination is always pro tanto wrong—and if anything does that, colonially subjugating them does. The self-respect account’s proponents arguably can analyze the interests that self-determination rights protect in terms of self-respect.³⁶

Ferguson and Veneziani’s (2021) account cannot do analogous work. A self-determining people is one whose members collectively control the political institutions governing their territory. But, as discussed in §6, the acquisition approach implies that few, if any, peoples have territorial rights. So, it cannot explain colonized peoples’ self-determination rights.

Third, the self-respect account illuminates what is necessarily wrongful about social oppression, of which colonialism is one kind. Oppression necessarily involves unfair social hierarchy. The self-respect account’s proponents might analyze oppression’s necessary wrong in terms of self-respect. Even if oppression sometimes fails to involve political subjugation in my sense, one may still argue that oppressive institutions threaten oppressed individuals’ social bases of self-respect.

Stilz’s (2019) account cannot do analogous work. While a people’s members should arguably participate in a (reasonable) shared political will, I doubt that an oppressed group’s members need to participate in a shared political will in Stilz’s sense. I do not deny that oppressed persons have reasons to act in solidarity. But solidarity does not require (a joint intention to begin) living under the same political institutions.

The self-respect account is therefore valuable not only because it offers a plausible explanation of why colonialism is necessarily wrongful, but also because it suggests promising approaches to other important issues in social and political philosophy.

Acknowledgements

For helpful discussions, I thank Daniel Altschuler, Ben Andrew, Paul Apostolodis, Grace Atkins, Aliosha Barranco Lopez, Mitch Barrington, Elvira Basevich, Kendra Chilson, Anja Chivukula, Katie Creel, Zeb Dempsey, Megha Devraj, Lorenzo Elijah, Aaron Elliot, Stitch Figueroa, Camila Flowerman, Steph van Fossen, Dimitri Gallow, Paul Garofolo, Ben Genta, Jasmine Gunkel, Mark Hinchliff, Robin Jeshion, David Haekwon Kim, Hannah Kim, Sonny Kim, Conny Knieling, Milana Kostic, Junhyo Lee, Chad Lee-Stronach, Olga Lenczewska, Philip Li, Shiying Li, Sharon Lloyd, Jon Mahoney, Nurit Matuk, Simon Căbulea May, David Miller, Thiago de Melo, Christian Nakazawa, Cara Nine, Jonathan Parry, Caleb Perl, Milo Phillips-Brown, Michael Pope, Mauricio Rebolledo Cervera, John Rudisill, Aaron Salomon, Kin San, Yasha Sapir, R. Seddon, Scott Sehon, Zeke Vergara, Kenneth Silver, Laura Siscoe, Andrew Stewart, Matthew Stewart, Mack Sullivan, Collis Tahzib, Kangyu Wang, Shu Wang, Nadja Winning, Matt Wiseman, and Will Yu. I also thank my audiences at the Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress’s 2022 conference, a 2022 meeting of the USC Speculative Society, the 2022 Oxford Graduate Philosophy Conference, the 2023 APA Central Division Meeting, and the 2024 APA Pacific Division Meeting. For exceptionally fruitful discussions and comments, I especially thank Charlotte Figueroa, John Hawthorne, Marcela Prieto Rudolphy, Mark Schroeder, Annie Stilz, and two anonymous reviewers from Philosophers’ Imprint. Most of all, however, I thank Jon Quong, who provided many insightful comments while I worked on this paper. Any errors committed in this paper are solely mine.