The Interdependence of All Things

1. Prologue

Various Eastern and Western traditions teach the interdependence or interconnectedness of all things.¹ For instance, Chapter 2 of the Daoist classic Laozi (Daodejing) states that

When the people of the world all know beauty as beauty, there arises the recognition of ugliness. When they all know the good as good, there arises the recognition of evil. Therefore: being and nonbeing produce each other; difficult and easy complete each other; long and short contrast each other; high and low distinguish each other; sound and voice harmonize with each other; front and back follow each other. (Chan 1963, 140)

On my reading, this passage proposes that, as soon as we recognize something as beautiful, there is already our recognition of ugliness, and vice versa, and that existence and nonexistence give rise to each other. Most people would agree that complementary concepts like “good” and “evil” are interdependent.² However, the Laozi appears to speak of concrete entities, such as beautiful and ugly things, good and evil actions, and so forth. The referents of complementary concepts (and not the concepts themselves) are taken to depend on, generate, and complete each other. Yet it seems counterintuitive to posit that pretty and ugly things depend on each other or that difficult and easy affairs complete each other.

Jizang (549–623 CE), a preeminent thinker of Chinese Madhyamaka (“Middle Way”) Buddhism, offers a similar stance by emphasizing the interdependence of the myriad things—namely, all things in the world. He claims that if interdependence is established, the myriad objects are established; otherwise, all the objects perish (i.e., lose their identities). This claim means that all things, as we know them in daily life, emerge as what they are in virtue of their mutual dependence.³ This interdependence occurs between causes and effects, living things and non-living things, and even jars and shirts. I take Jizang to endorse the thesis that the referents of complementary concepts or words are interdependent—call this the interdependence thesis. Prima facie, this thesis looks implausible. How can a rock in the Western Desert of Egypt be interdependent with a penguin (as a non-rock) in Antarctica? They exist vast distances apart and seem to have no causal connection. This paper aims to demonstrate the plausibility of this seemingly paradoxical thesis.

Chinese Madhyamaka developed from the Madhyamaka school of Indian Buddhism, which was putatively founded by the Indian philosopher Nāgārjuna (c. 150–250), who propounds the doctrine of emptiness, according to which all things are empty of any independent and invariable nature or existence—of any intrinsic nature (Skt. svabhāva). Nāgārjuna appears to acknowledge the interdependence thesis and some of Jizang’s ideas about the thesis occur in his commentary on Nāgārjuna’s seminal work the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. However, this paper focuses on Jizang’s Sanlun school rather than Indian Madhyamaka; I make no claim that what is said about the former applies to the latter.

My approach in the following sections is chiefly that of rational construction and reconstruction. Drawing on Jizang’s treatises, I reconstruct his ontology, which exemplifies what I call “metaphysical nonrealism”—roughly, the view that the existence and identity of worldly things depend significantly on our conceptual imputation. Building upon these treatises and this view, I construct an argument for the plausibility of the interdependence thesis. In keeping with this approach, I set aside historical explanations and detailed exegetical analyses.

Section 2 clarifies my specific understanding of the interdependence thesis, which relies on a form of identity dependence. Section 3 explicates how Jizang’s ontology exemplifies metaphysical nonrealism. Section 4 analyzes Jizang’s account of the interdependence of things and presents an argument for the thesis. Section 5 addresses several objections to the argument. The concluding section wraps up the paper.

2. The Interdependence Thesis

The interdependence thesis involves a reciprocal relation of dependence between two or more entities. First consider the concept of existential dependence. Following Fine’s (1995) essence-based account of ontological dependence, existential dependence can be defined as follows: of two entities x and y, x depends for its existence upon y iff it lies in the essence of x that x exists only if y exists. For instance, the singleton set {Socrates} depends for its existence upon Socrates if and only if {Socrates} is essentially such that it exists only if Socrates exists. This definition, however, relies on the notion of essence, which is problematic for the metaphysical nonrealist approach articulated in Section 3. This approach recommends we forgo the ontologically heavyweight notion of essence and essential properties.⁴

Instead, let us adopt the following definition of existential dependence: x depends for its existence upon y iff x cannot exist without y in that y’s existence is a necessary contributor to x’s existence. The that-clause makes explicit that y’s existence plays a required role in grounding and explaining x’s existence, even though y might not be the sole determinant of x’s existence. (I do not distinguish here between ontological-existential dependence and causal-existential dependence.) The existence of x and y can be sequential or simultaneous or both. In sequential cases, like an apple seed (y) giving rise to an apple sprout (x), the predecessor typically perishes when the successor arises. In simultaneous cases, like a living body (x) and its microbiota (y), both entities coexist in mutual dependence. In combined cases, like a father (y) and his son (x), one entity exists prior to, and may continue to exist with, the other. In all these cases, y is needed for x’s existence or initial existence.

However, the concept of existential dependence does not align with the interdependence thesis. Following Nāgārjuna, Jizang contends that a cause and its effect are interdependent, such that there is no cause without effect and no effect without cause.⁵ Yet, while the concepts “cause” and “effect” are notionally interdependent—mutually defining and unintelligible in isolation—it seems incorrect to claim that a specific cause (the seed) and its effect (the sprout) are existentially interdependent. The sprout causally and existentially depends on the seed, but not vice versa.

Moreover, existential interdependence implies simultaneous existence of the interdependent entities. But the seed and the sprout do not coexist. Consider John’s becoming a father upon his son’s birth. Assuming that “father” and “son” are complementary concepts, the thesis implies that John the father and his son are interdependent. However, this interdependence need not entail their continuous coexistence; John remains dependent on his son for his fatherhood even after his son’s death.

The reciprocal relation of dependence involved in the interdependence thesis is, I argue, identity dependence rather than existential dependence. By “identity,” I mean the defining characteristics of a thing—what the thing is or what kind of thing it is—which is distinct from whether it exists. I do not mean “identity” in the sense of the relation of identity. For instance, John’s identity as a father can be said to depend on the identity of his son as a son; without the person that we identify as his son, we would not identify John as a father. This example illustrates the following definition of identity dependence: x depends for its identity upon y iff x cannot be the sort of thing it is without y in that y’s identity is a necessary contributor to x’s identity.

It is helpful to consider how identity dependence is understood in analytic philosophy. In this context, identity dependence is typically viewed as a species of essential dependence. If x depends for its identity upon y, then x’s essence can be said to constitute its identity, while y is a determining constituent of that essence. Tahko and Lowe (2020, 23) define identity dependence as follows: x depends for its identity upon y iff there is a relation “R” such that it is part of the essence of x that x is related by R to y. For example, the singleton set {Socrates} depends for its identity on Socrates because there is a relation—namely, “being a member of the singleton set”—such that it is part of the essence of {Socrates} that it is the singleton set of Socrates. Here, what determines (or partially determines) the identity of the dependent thing (x) is the identity of something (y, the dependee) constitutive of that thing. For instance, a set’s identity is determined by the identities of its members; similarly, the identity of an event, such as a marriage or an assassination, depends on and is determined by the identities of the individuals involved (Tahko and Lowe 2020, 20–24; Lowe 1998, 147–149).

In contrast to this essentialist view, the nonrealist approach advocates abandoning the notion of essence. Under this approach, a given thing x is indeterminate regarding its identity or kind, which means its defining characteristics are not fixed and inherent but depend on the conceptual perspective through which it is identified.⁶ Consequently, we can only provisionally conceive x’s identity relative to the perspective we adopt on a given occasion. Rather than treat x’s essence as constituting its identity, we focus on the concept used to identify x on a given occasion and consider x’s identity to be what that concept provisionally represents it to be. For instance, x’s identity can be a human, a man, or a father insofar as we apply to x the concepts “human,” “man,” or “father,” respectively. Crucially, none of these concepts represent x’s supposed true nature; there is no objective, determinate truth about x’s identity apart from our conceptual imputations.

Furthermore, we must shift our understanding of identity from one in which something is determined by its internal constitution to one in which something is determined through its contrast with something it is not—namely, the referent of the complementary concept concerned. What x is can be determined by what x is not and not by the identity of x’s constituent parts or properties. For example, John’s identity as a father can be determined through contrast with his son. John the father depends for his identity upon the identity of his son as a son, and his son’s identity as a son is a necessary contributor to his own identity as a father. John cannot be what he is as a father without the person that we identify as his son. Similarly, the identity of x as the living depends on and is determined by the identity of y as the non-living. Here “living” and “non-living,” unlike “father” and “son,” are contradictory concepts such that one term of the pair fully defines the other through exclusion.

To further highlight the distinctness of my Madhyamaka-based account, consider two principles of identity dependence that Tahko and Lowe propose (2020, 24–25; 1998, 150). Their first principle asserts that if x depends for its identity upon y, then, necessarily, x exists only if y exists. This principle looks plausible given Tahko and Lowe's (2020) conception of identity dependence; after all, a (non-empty) set cannot exist unless its members exist. However, the principle is untenable under my account. Jizang (2016b, 28a15–18) affirms the codependence between the existent and the nonexistent as referents of the complementary concepts “existent” and “nonexistent.” Yet it is absurd to say that the existent exists if and only if the nonexistent exists. Since the interdependence thesis relies on this account of identity dependence, it does not entail that interdependent entities must coexist. Similarly, the account does not demand the continuous coexistence of John the father and his son, even though their identities are mutually dependent. This observation helps further distinguish identity dependence from existential dependence.

The second principle asserts that if x is not identical with y and x depends for its identity upon y, then y does not depend for its identity upon x. Tahko and Lowe (2020) think that x and y’s mutual dependence for their identities would engender a vicious circle that undermines their distinctness. In contrast, my account embraces mutual dependence and views the identity dependence relation as having the following properties. It is symmetric: if John the father depends for his identity upon his son, then the son depends for his identity upon John the father (and conversely). Because complementary concepts are distinct, this mutual dependence does not engender a vicious circle undermining x and y’s distinctness. The relation is irreflexive because a thing does not depend for its identity upon itself—recall that identity determination requires contrast and difference. It is also transitive: if x, y, and z are distinct, and x depends for its identity upon y, and y depends for its identity upon z, then x depends for its identity upon z. To illustrate this transitivity, consider Jizang’s (2016b, 131b7–11) example of the interdependence of past, present, and future: these three times depend on each other for their identities. For analytic clarity, I will henceforth treat identity dependence as a two-place relation involving the referents of only two complementary concepts.

While my contrastive, nonessentialist account of identity dependence requires further vindication, it offers a novel perspective that competes with Tahko and Lowe’s constitutive, essentialist account. My account provides a strong foundation for the interdependence thesis. For instance, while it seems incorrect to claim that a cause and its effect are existentially interdependent, they may be mutually identity-dependent in the sense my account prescribes. Moreover, we should interpret the phrase “there is no cause without effect” to mean that nothing has the identity of being a cause without something having the identity of being an effect.

Despite these clarifications, challenges remain before one can fully accept the interdependence thesis. The claims that the existent depends on the nonexistent for being existent and that an apple depends on a non-apple (e.g., an orange) for being an apple seem counterintuitive. The following sections explore a nonrealist approach to address relevant challenges and provide additional support for my account of identity dependence.

3. Jizang’s Nonrealist Ontology

Jizang interprets Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of emptiness to mean that the myriad things originate in dependence on various causal and noncausal factors and are therefore empty of any determinate nature, form, and identity. Specifically, because things that complementary concepts refer to are interdependent, they lack determinate nature.⁷ Like Nāgārjuna, Jizang also views things as empty of intrinsic nature and as not intrinsically real.⁸

Among the noncausal factors that bring about the myriad things are our conceptual contributions. Jizang remarks that “the myriad things and figures are all brought forth by the [conceptualizing] mind” (2016a, 930c10–11). Taken literally, this statement might suggest that things are entirely constructed by our minds. However, if Jizang held that things are entirely mind-constructed, it would contradict his assertion that things originate dependently on causal factors, which are distinct from noncausal factors, such as conceptual contributions. Jizang’s (2016b, 24a4–14) discussion of causation indicates his opposition to viewing it as a mere fiction. Therefore, we should understand him as maintaining that things are significantly, but not entirely, shaped by our conceptualization. Consequently, I interpret Jizang as holding that what we normally take to be things originate from both our conceptualization and mind-independent elements in experience (that is, elements independent of the activities of a conceptualizing mind).

Contemporary commentators widely recognize that Madhyamaka thinkers reject metaphysical realism, the view that things and their properties exist independently of our conceptual contributions (James 2018). Their rejection of metaphysical realism resonates with certain Western philosophical positions, particularly Putnam’s internal realism of the 1980s (Putnam 1981; Putnam 1987; Putnam 1988), which is usually regarded as a form of antirealism.⁹

According to Putnam, the objects of our experience “do not exist independently of conceptual schemes. We cut up the world into objects when we introduce one or another scheme of description” (Putnam 1981, 52). Objects emerge as products of both our conceptualization and objective factors in experience. This view challenges the notion of objects in themselves and their inherent properties, as objects are always understood through the lens of our conceptual schemes. Moreover, for Putnam (1987, 18–20; 1988, 114), the same situation can be described in many different ways depending on the conceptual scheme adopted or the use of words. This results in a plurality of irreducible and true descriptions of the situation—descriptions that are accurate within their respective schemes and cannot be reduced to a single, privileged description. Yet there is no objective, mind-independent fact of the matter as to which scheme to adopt in ascertaining the truth of these descriptions—the choice is merely a matter of conceptual convenience.

Putnam’s denial of an objective fact of the matter raises concerns about relativism, where the truth of claims about objects and their properties becomes purely relative to the chosen conceptual scheme, given that there is no objective basis for preferring one scheme over another. Furthermore, Putnam’s position seems to lead to an intuitively implausible consequence: before humans existed, there were no stars, rocks, trilobites, and so forth, insofar as the existence of these objects depends on human conceptualization.

Jizang’s position offers a more nuanced approach: while he holds that the things we encounter in everyday experience are significantly shaped by conceptual contributions, he appears to acknowledge the way things truly are (zhufa shixiang)—an ineffable reality that transcends human conceptualization. This preconceptual reality predates sentient beings, and entities such as stars and rocks might exist within it in some inchoate form. Moreover, it might offer objective grounds for evaluating different conceptual perspectives, potentially allowing us to avoid mere relativism.

This acknowledgment of a preconceptual reality distinguishes Jizang’s position from metaphysical antirealism, which denies any reality independent of our conceptual contribution. To capture this nuanced stance, I propose the term “metaphysical nonrealism” to denote a middle way between realism and antirealism that recognizes both conceptual dependence and independence. That is, whereas the existence and identity of worldly things depend significantly on our conceptual imputation, some aspect of reality is independent of human conceptualization. Jizang’s concept of “the way things truly are” points to this extended, mind-independent aspect of reality that affects our experience of worldly things. This aspect of reality, however, is not separate from worldly things but rather constitutes their preconceptual state.

The concept of ineffability raises the paradox of how one can speak of what is unspeakable. However, I have tackled this issue elsewhere (Ho 2016) and shall not pursue it here. Importantly, my argumentation for the interdependence thesis does not rest on the acknowledgment of anything ineffable. Instead, the argument focuses on the more accessible aspects of Jizang’s nonrealist ontology.

In my interpretation, Jizang’s nonrealism acknowledges that conceptualization operates at both subconscious and conscious levels. While some neuroscientists have observed that the brain constructs our perceptual world, Jizang might contend that the conceptualizing mind subconsciously carves up the way things truly are into a world of concrete things. Since this subconscious conceptualization operates outside our immediate awareness, we naturally experience ourselves as inhabiting an already structured, ready-made world where things appear as distinct objects. Whereas conceptualization at the subconscious level molds the way things truly are into the things of everyday experience, conceptualization at the conscious level—my focus here—determines how we conceptually identify things as such-and-such. These concepts function as constituents of consciously accessible thoughts that can be adequately expressed in language. I assume here a close correlation between concepts and words in that concepts are mental entities that underlie our use of language.

On Jizang’s nonrealism, things become what they are through our conscious conceptual imputations. He states: “Things do not have determinate forms. It is through our conceptualization of a form that we designate something as ‘taste.’ Without such conceptualization, the thing would not be taste” (Jizang 2016a, 939b10–11). Consider any thing x that we might label as such. Prior to conscious conceptualization, it lacks a specific identity and is not yet categorized as a certain kind. It is originally neither x nor non-x, neither existent nor nonexistent, neither P nor non-P. Through different conceptual perspectives, we take it to be so-and-so via conceptual imputation. By actively imputing specific concepts to x, we contribute significantly to its becoming an existent something, to its having a specific identity, and even to its being viewed as determinately such-and-such. Therefore, a thing’s existence and identity depend significantly on our conceptual imputation.¹⁰

To further understand Jizang’s nonrealist ontology, consider his assertion that “all things are not separate from the middle (zhong) and the provisional (jia) and so are all the middle and the provisional” (2016b, 28a12). This seemingly obscure statement offers a useful vantage point for comprehending his ontology. In my interpretation, the notion of the middle refers to the state of things prior to conceptual imputation. In this state, before we apply concepts like “this” or “that,” a given thing is neither this nor that, neither P nor non-P, and so on—hence the term “middle.” This notion further points to the way things truly are, a reality transcending even subconscious conceptualization. Because the way things truly are is the way all things really and genuinely are, Jizang can claim that all things are not separate from the middle.

The notion of the provisional, on the other hand, refers to the state of things after conceptual imputation. The Chinese character for “provisional” connotes fictitiousness, borrowing, and dependence. Through conceptual imputation, a thing is molded into a specifically identified object by borrowing or assuming specific concepts and depending on them. (It also depends on its causal factors, mereological constituents, and so forth.) The resultant provisional thing is largely conceptually shaped and lacks intrinsic reality. Because we readily know things as such-and-such through conceptual imputation, Jizang can claim that all things are not separate from the provisional.

For Jizang, all things lack fixed and inherent defining characteristics. Moreover, things belong to different kinds not because they have different essential properties but because they are differently classified through different conceptual imputations—to be sure, our imputation and classification generally follow social conventions. This nonrealist stance aligns with the widespread rejection of essentialism (here the view that things are of different kinds if and only if they have different essential properties) in contemporary philosophy of biology regarding the living world (Dupré and Nicholson 2018, 23). This departure from essentialism supports my account of identity dependence, which denies the role of essential properties in constituting the identity of things. Meanwhile, the interdependence thesis applies specifically to things in their provisional status: when things are conceptually imputed, they are inevitably interdependent. The following section demonstrates why provisional things are interdependent.

4. An Argument for the Thesis

Jizang (2016b, 97b20–23, 99a4) contends that all provisional entities are mutually dependent.¹¹ Remarkably, his concept of interdependence extends beyond familiar relational pairs, such as long and short, in that even seemingly unrelated objects, such as a jar and a shirt, are deemed as interdependent. Jizang’s (2016d, 95c21–24) rationale pertains to the interdependence between affirmation and negation. Since “x-is-a-jar” (an affirmation) and “x-is-not-a-jar” (a negation) are interdependent, and because this interdependence extends to the objects themselves, we can infer that jars and things that are not jars are mutually dependent. While this seems a leap in logic, because a shirt belongs in the category of non-jars, Jizang can conclude that any given jar and any given shirt are interdependent. Note, however, that the interdependence between a jar and a shirt is derivative, as it logically hinges on the more fundamental interdependence between jars and non-jars.

As previously stated, Jizang affirms the codependence between the existent and the nonexistent as referents of the complementary concepts “existent” and “nonexistent.” This involves identity codependence: the existent depends on the nonexistent for its identity, and vice versa. The existent is such only in relation to and dependence on the nonexistent, and the same holds for the nonexistent. Again, there seems to be a dubious leap from the codependence of “existent” and “nonexistent” to the codependence of the existent and nonexistent objects themselves.

In the two cases discussed above—the jar and the shirt, and the existent and the nonexistent—Jizang appears to move from the interdependence of thoughts (“x-is-a-jar” and “x-is-not-a-jar”) and of concepts (“existent” and “nonexistent”) to the interdependence of their referential objects. This raises the question of how to justify extending the interdependence claim from concepts to the corresponding objects. In refuting an opponent’s view on interdependence, Jizang asks: “Mutual dependence applies to all entities; how can names be interdependent while (referential) objects not be so?” (2016b, 99a4). He implies that both names (as referring words) and objects (their referents) are themselves interdependent. I will first examine the interdependence of referring words, which, in conjunction with metaphysical nonrealism, justifies the extension from concepts to referential objects.

Nagel (1986, 97) writes that “every concept that we have contains potentially the idea of its own complement—the idea of what the concept doesn’t apply to.” We can interpret Nagel’s claim through a Chinese Madhyamaka lens as follows. A referring concept marks out the thing (or things) it is applied to only if it differentiates the thing from other things to which the concept does not apply but its complementary concept does. These other things, while being set aside, serve to bring the marked-out thing into relief and so must be known implicitly. Consequently, the referring concept implicitly refers to these other things by depending on, and containing potentially, its complementary concept, which refers explicitly and directly to the things. This observation applies to all concepts, so every concept can be said to contain potentially the concept of what it does not apply to.¹²

Given the close correlation between concepts and words, we can take complementary words, such as “cause” and “effect,” “long” and “short,” and “existent” and “nonexistent,” to be interdependent and (partially) interimplicative. For any referring word “P,” we can always coin a word “non-P” to form an interdependent pair of complementary words. Because of their interdependence and interimplication, we cannot introduce one word without implicitly introducing its complement.

While demonstrating the interdependence of complementary words is relatively straightforward, the interdependence of their referents is more contentious. Many would argue that a shirt is inherently a shirt and does not depend on any non-shirts for what it is; they could also argue that the fact we, contrasting it with non-shirts, give it the name “shirt” does not indicate that it is interdependent with a jar or any other non-shirt. Thus, most would reject Jizang’s claim that, just as non-jars depend on jars, a shirt, which is not a jar, depends on a jar for what it is.¹³

Jizang (2016a, 958c21–23) contends that things obtain their names through mutual dependence. In light of his nonrealism, we can interpret Jizang’s contention to imply that things do not inherently possess specific features and labels but acquire them through our sorting of things into contrasting and interdependent pairs. This implies both that the names things acquire are complementary and that any two things, x and y, referred to by complementary names are mutually dependent. Therefore, the referents of complementary words are interdependent. While this reasoning is hasty, it nonetheless suggests we look to nonrealism to buttress the interdependence of linguistic referents. In what follows, I develop a line of thought that demonstrates the plausibility of the interdependence thesis, which is conditional on the tenability of nonrealism.

Given nonrealism, a given thing x is originally neither this nor that, neither existent nor nonexistent, neither P nor non-P. Through conceptual or linguistic imputation, x becomes characterized as something specific—for instance, as something P, serving as the referent of the word “P.” In light of my interpretation of Nagel’s claim, the act of imputing “P” to x and conceiving of x as P necessarily requires imputing “non-P” to something else (y) and conceiving of it as non-P, which brings x the P into relief. This same dynamic applies conversely to the imputation of “non-P” to y. Thus, “P” and “non-P” are mutually dependent. Nonrealism holds that the identities and relations of x and y depend substantially on our linguistic imputation. Therefore, if imputing “P” to x makes x into x the P and imputing “non-P” to y makes y into y the non-P, then the interdependence between “P” and “non-P” should signify an interdependence between x the P and y the non-P.

This interdependence arises because the imputation of “P” and “non-P” reveals that x the P and y the non-P bring each other into relief. In view of nonrealism and the mutual manifestation thesis, we can reasonably infer that this mutual relief-bringing indicates their interdependence. The relation of interdependence is imputed to x the P and y the non-P precisely because they make each other manifest. Consequently, without y the non-P, there can be no x the P—that is, no thing is both x and bears the identity of being P. The same holds true for y the non-P. Therefore, whenever we characterize John as such-and-such—existent, human, a father, and so forth—he necessarily depends on things that are not such-and-such. If we impute “father” to him, John the father must depend on someone who bears the designation “son.” The same dependency applies to John’s son. Thus, John the father and his son are interdependent. Likewise, John the existent and the nonexistent are interdependent.

This line of thought can be expressed as a formal argument:

1. Prior to conceptual imputation, a given thing x is neither P nor non-P. (A Chinese Madhyamaka idea)

2. The identity and relations of any given thing depend significantly on our conceptual or linguistic imputation. (Metaphysical nonrealism)

3. x becomes something P through our imputing to it the word “P.” (From 1 and 2)

4. Imputing “P” to x and conceiving of x as something P necessitates conceiving of something else (y) as the referent of the complementary word “non-P,” which brings x the P into relief. Similarly for the imputation of “non-P” to y. (From 3 and a plausible linguistic observation)

5. The fact that x the P and y the non-P bring each other into relief signifies their identity interdependence. (From 2, 4, and the mutual manifestation thesis)

6. x the P and y the non-P depend on each other for their identities. (From 5)

7. Therefore, the referents of complementary words are interdependent. (From 6)

The cogency of this argument depends mainly on whether one finds nonrealism tenable, but this complex issue lies beyond the scope of this paper. Since the argument concludes with the interdependence thesis, if the argument is cogent, the thesis is plausible. Furthermore, this analysis lends support to my account of identity dependence, as the account stresses the role of contrast in determining the identity of things.

5. Objections and Replies

In the preceding section, I argued for the plausibility of the interdependence thesis, thereby suggesting its relevance for contemporary philosophical consideration. This section addresses three potential objections to my argument.

Objection 1: From a metaphysical realist perspective, an apple is inherently an apple prior to whatever relation it may have to things that are not apples; it does not depend on non-apples for being the sort of thing it is. Similarly, John is inherently a human, regardless of his relationship to his son; indeed, John’s inherent properties as a human make possible his parental relation to the son (cf. Taber 1998, 217–218). Therefore, the interdependence thesis and the argument presented above are fundamentally flawed.

Reply: Metaphysical realism and nonrealism differ fundamentally in their approaches to the nature and relations of things. I have defended a particular form of nonrealism elsewhere (Ho 2023) and shall here simply offer further clarifications. Given nonrealism, x lacks any inherent properties—those that are independent and non-relational. We might say that x possesses certain indeterminate features that, given our cognitive mechanisms and conceptual perspectives, dispose us to view it in particular ways. For instance, when adopting a perspective that favors viewing x as an apple, we impute the concept “apple” to x by contrasting it with things that we correspondingly view as non-apples, which helps establish x’s identity as an apple. Therefore, x’s identity as an apple depends on non-apples, our conceptual perspective, and our act of imputation. Thus, x’s property of being an apple is dependent. Because a thing instantiates relational properties only in relation to another thing, x’s property of being an apple is also relational. Hence, x lacks any inherent property of being an apple. As an illustration, imagine a possible world filled fully and only with (what we might call) apple-stuff. Within that very world, which lacks contrasts and distinctions, using the concept “apple,” or the concept “distinct,” would make little sense, as would attributing the property of appleness to the stuff.

While John the human does not depend on his son for his identity, he depends on things that are not human for who he is. Similarly, John the existent depends on nonexistent things for his being existent. So, either we refrain from characterizing John in any specific way, or we accept that in characterizing him as such-and-such, he necessarily depends on things that are not such-and-such. Any characterization of an entity inevitably entails dependence on the referent of a complementary concept.

Objection 2: In the argument, “x” and “y” are placeholders for referring words, which means they can refer to any entities. While an apple might depend on some non-apples for its identity as an apple, it is not clear why it should depend on every orange, every table, indeed every non-apple. In addition, the interdependence thesis seems to imply the view that the concept “apple” is determined by every single non-apple thing, but that would unfortunately render conceptual determination, the process by which we define and categorize concepts, cognitively intractable (cf. Kang 2025a).

Reply: According to the interdependence thesis, any two things (x and y) that complementary concepts refer to are mutually dependent for their identities. Thus, the identity of any given apple depends on and is determined by the identity of every non-apple. However, a particular x becomes an apple only through our imputation of “apple” within a specific context and perspective. Therefore, understanding this identity dependence does not require examining every individual apple in existence. Similarly, an apple’s dependence on every non-apple is mediated by the conceptual category “non-apple,” which defines the relevant complementary set. Consequently, grasping this dependence involves only a general consideration of what falls under the concepts “apple” and “non-apple” rather than an exhaustive analysis of every particular instance.

My argument does not address how a concept is determined. We can say that the concept “apple” is determined directly by the complementary concept “non-apple” and by common features loosely shared by apples (such as their generally round shape and sweet or tart taste), and only indirectly by common features loosely shared by non-apples. This vague determination aligns with how “apple,” like any other ordinary concept, is vague in meaning and reference. Because the concept is not determined by every single non-apple, the issue of cognitive intractability does not arise.

Objection 3: The argument relies considerably on the views of Jizang, a historical figure associated with the Sanlun Buddhist school. From a broader history-of-philosophy perspective, one might question whether the argument secures the connection between nonrealism and the interdependence thesis. To secure that connection, one should engage with other traditions that also recognize the interdependence of all things. Failing to do so might weaken the argument’s weight and persuasiveness.

Reply: My argument for the thesis is primarily philosophical, such that its credibility should be evaluated on its own rational terms. However, my overall approach would benefit from considering the relevant views of other philosophical traditions. Chinese Buddhist thinkers of the Tiantai and Huayan schools also acknowledge the interdependence of all things. Tiantai belongs to a broadly Madhyamaka tradition and thus requires no separate treatment here. Huayan draws inspiration from several sources, including Madhyamaka thought. Apart from highlighting the mutual identity (xiangji) and mutual entering (xiangru) of things, Huayan thinkers also affirm the interdependence of all things. Kang (2025b) appeals to Fine’s essence-based account of ontological dependence to show how mutual identity and entering result in the universal interdependence of all things. However, she does not invoke nonrealism or a similar conception that emphasizes the role of conceptualization in shaping the world.

We would benefit from attending to traditions completely outside the Madhyamaka orbit. Recall the passage from the Laozi, Chapter 2, which began this paper and expresses the concept of interdependence. This passage implies that the referents of complementary words like “beauty” and “ugliness” are interdependent. Generalizing this view to encompass all complementary words suggests the interdependence thesis. On my reading, as soon as we recognize something as beautiful, the recognition of ugliness is already present, which indicates that the interdependence concerns the identity of things rather than their existence. Even the phrase “being and nonbeing produce each other” can be construed to mean that an item becomes existent—that is, possesses the identity of being existent—by depending on nonexistence, and becomes nonexistent by depending on existence.¹⁴

Laozi posits that, while the nameless is the beginning of heaven and earth, having-names is the mother of the myriad things (Chapter 1). He further asserts that names come into existence when carving (zhi) begins (Chapter 32). Hong (2024, 141–143) interprets “carving” as the process of introducing various names and using them to divide an unstructured world into distinct things of various categories. Laozi presumably holds that people employ names to carve an original prelinguistic reality—the nameless Dao—into this world of myriad things, to which those names are imputed. Laozi’s views on Dao’s namelessness and worldly things’ dependence on linguistic imputation indicate his commitment to a form of nonrealism.¹⁵

One could argue that even if Laozi accepts both the interdependence thesis and nonrealism, this does not guarantee that his acceptance of the thesis stems from his commitment to nonrealism. Still, following the approach taken with Jizang, one can draw on Laozi’s nonrealism to argue for the thesis. The case of Laozi, then, serves as another example of how a nonrealist perspective can lead to the affirmation of interdependence.

6. Conclusion

This paper draws on clues from Jizang’s treatises to construct an argument that demonstrates the conditional plausibility of the interdependence thesis. This endeavor involves offering an innovative and potentially viable account of identity dependence and elucidating a conception of metaphysical nonrealism to help support the argument. The paper also responds to several objections to the argument and hints at its relevance for cross-cultural and cross-traditional philosophical dialogue.

Although the interdependence of all things is a teaching found in certain Eastern and possibly Western traditions, contemporary philosophers may readily dismiss the interdependence thesis as being naïve or mystical, given its seemingly counterintuitive implications. Nonetheless, I hope to have provided a sensible and rational argument for the thesis, one that safeguards it against hasty dismissals. Recall that the argument begins with a claim from Nagel and that some analytic philosophers’ viewpoints resemble nonrealism. The thesis and its nonrealist framework offer an intriguing and promising avenue for future research that invites further exploration of the interrelated nature of the world.¹⁶